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ABSTRACT 
Although some theorists take age-based exclusion as an essential part of 
democracy, others try to justify it with reference to the differences between „children‟ 
and „adults‟. One of the most important theories among the latter group is Robert A. 
Dahl‟s theory of inclusion. 
This study aims to liberate the issue of voting age from the controversial 
terminology of human maturation by showing that democracy looks beyond the 
dichotomy of „childhood‟ and „adulthood‟ when it comes to the right to vote. For this 
purpose, this thesis offers a four-step test for enfranchisement that encompasses the 
justifications that have been utilized for excluding certain groups throughout history. 
Academic and parliamentary debates concerning age-based exclusion are no exception 
to the validity of this test. Exclusion of „children‟ is justified via the same justifications. 
The history of voting age reveals that when „children‟ play an important role in 
political life, their inclusion becomes more probable. This observation demonstrates that 
democracy does not exclude certain individuals because they are „children‟: it rather 
labels them as „children‟ because they maintain to be politically passive. Democratic 
régimes consider political activism as a positive sign of moral autonomy, which is the 
main criterion of being included in demos according to Dahl. Turkey, on the other hand, 
differs from this democratic approach with its top-down focus on régime stability rather 
than the importance of representation and political awareness for democracy. 
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ÖZET 
Bazı teorisyenler ve politikacılar yaşa dayalı dışlamayı demokrasinin temel bir 
parçası olarak kabul etseler de, diğerleri „çocuklar‟ın demokrasideki yerini onlarla 
„yetişkinler‟ arasında var olduğu kabul edilen farklardan yola çıkarak açıklamaya 
çalışmaktadırlar. İkinci grupta yer alan teorilerden en önemlilerinden biri Robert A. 
Dahl‟ın demokrasi teorisidir. 
Bu çalışma, oy hakkı meselesinde demokrasilerin „çocukluk‟-„yetişkinlik‟ 
ikiliğinin ötesine baktığını göstererek, seçme yaşı konusunu insanın olgunlaşmasına 
gönderme yapan tartışmalı terminolojiden kurtarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçla bu 
çalışmada, geçmişte çeşitli grupları seçmen kitlesinden dışlamak için kullanılmış olan 
gerekçeleri sınıflandırmayı kolaylaştıran dört-aşamalı bir test önerilmektedir. Bu testin 
şartları, toplum üyeliği, çıkarların temsilinin gerekliliği, yetenek ve rejim istikrarından 
oluşmaktadır. Yaşa dayalı dışlamayı konu alan akademik ve politik tartışmalar, bu testin 
geçerliliği için bir istisna oluşturmamaktadır. Söz konusu tartışmalarda „çocuklar‟ın 
dışlanması da bu dört temaya gönderme yapılarak ele alınmaktadır. 
Seçme yaşının tarihi göstermektedir ki, „çocuklar‟ politik hayatta önemli bir rol 
oynadıklarında, seçmen kitlesine kabul edilebilmektedirler. Bu gözlem, demokrasinin 
belirli bireyleri „çocuk‟ oldukları için dışlamadığını, aksine, bu kişiler siyasî olarak pasif 
kalmaya devam ettikleri için demokrasinin onları „çocuk‟ olarak sınıflandırdığını 
göstermektedir. Demokratik rejimler siyasî aktivizmi, Dahl‟a göre demos‟ta yer almanın 
temel şartı olan ahlakî otonominin olumlu bir işareti olarak değerlendirmektedirler. Öte 
yandan Türkiye, temsilin ve siyasî farkındalığın demokrasi için öneminden ziyade 
rejimin istikrarını korumaya verdiği tepeden inme önemle, bu demokratik yaklaşımdan 
ayrılmaktadır. 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Above all, I shall thank Her for her unique friendship, understanding company, 
invaluable encouragement, beautiful existence and intriguing personality. Of course, I 
owe a lot to my parents and sisters: to Dad, for teaching me how to ask right questions; 
to Mom, for showing me how to liberate my mind; to Merve and Melike, for being with 
me to prove that age is next to nothing when compared to mutual respect. 
No words could define the patience and sympathy my thesis advisor, Prof. Sabri 
Sayarı, and members of my thesis jury, Ayhan Akman and Hakan Erdem, have shown 
for me. The development process of this thesis had consisted of silent times of research, 
contemplation and writing interrupted with me, knocking on their doors and pouring the 
results on them. Without their guidance I would have never reached the conclusion. 
The years between my admission to the Political Science and Public 
Administration department at Bilkent University and the one I will be submitting this 
thesis to Sabancı University, have been embellished by many people, all of which I 
would like to call my friends. Faculty members of Bilkent POLS, especially Nedim 
Karakayalı, Jeremy Salt, James Alexander, Ayça Kurtoğlu and İlker Aytürk have given 
me the academic foundations for my future career and the belief that age and status 
mean nothing when two people understand each other. These foundations and belief 
have been improved by many faculty members at Sabancı besides my thesis jury. At 
this point, I would like to thank Prof. Şerif Mardin for the time and effort he has 
dedicated to me and my fellow classmates; and Prof. Ayşe Kadıoğlu for her great 
contributions to the development phase of my thesis. 
Of course the most important part of these six years includes the times I have 
enjoyed with friends from Bilkent Yeni Ufuklar Kulübü, Bilkent POLS, Sabancı POLS 
and Sabancı SPS Team. Tolga Kobaş, Aslı Baysal, Eda Kuşku, Aybars Görgülü and 
Ezgi Gürcan have contributed a lot to my thesis and added great fun to the last two 
years that could have been lost. 
Without the help of Hilmi Çelik and the library staff of the Grand National 
Assembly, I could have never reached the documents I have used on Turkey. Without 
İlkay Gelen and İdil Zengin, Austria would remain a secret for me. 
 
İsmail O. Postalcıoğlu 
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: “No Child‟s Play” ....................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2 
Justifications for Exclusion from Demos: the Four-Step Test .......................................... 4 
 2.1. Servants and the Poor ..................................................................................... 5 
 2.2. Women‟s Suffrage ......................................................................................... 8 
 2.3. Literacy Tests ............................................................................................... 10 
 2.4. The Four-Step Test for Enfranchisement ..................................................... 12 
CHAPTER 3 
Age-Based Exclusion: Justifications, Criticisms and Alternatives ................................. 14 
 3.1. Justifications for Age-Based Exclusion ....................................................... 14 
  3.1.1. Community Membership and Representation of Interests .............. 15 
  3.1.2. Competence ..................................................................................... 17 
  3.1.3. Régime Stability .............................................................................. 19 
  3.1.4. Temporariness of Age-Based Exclusion ......................................... 19 
 3.2. Criticisms for Justifications ......................................................................... 20 
  3.2.1. Community Membership and Representation of Interests .............. 20 
  3.2.2. Competence ..................................................................................... 23 
  3.1.3. Régime Stability .............................................................................. 24 
 3.3. Age Criterion................................................................................................ 26 
  3.3.1. Test of Competence: an Alternative? .............................................. 27 
 3.4. Proposed Solutions to the Problems............................................................. 28 
  3.4.1. Lowering the Current Voting Age ................................................... 28 
  3.4.2. Abolishing the Voting Age (Parents‟ Vote) .................................... 30 
  3.4.3. A Guardian for the Interests of Children ......................................... 30 
 3.5. Voting Age and the Four-Step Test for Enfranchisement ............................ 31 
viii 
 
 3.6. Dahl‟s Theory of Democratic Exclusion ..................................................... 32 
  3.6.1. Guardianship Arguments ................................................................. 34 
  3.6.2. Age-Based Exclusion: a Presupposition or a Consequence?........... 36 
  3.6.3. The Contingent Principle: Capacity for Autonomy ......................... 38 
  3.6.4. Dahl‟s Theory and the Four-Step Test ............................................ 41 
CHAPTER 4 
The History of Voting Age ............................................................................................. 45 
 4.1. Conditionality of Voting Age Requirements ............................................... 47 
 4.2. Three Waves of Voting Age Reduction ....................................................... 50 
 4.3. Lowering the Voting Age to Sixteen: a New Wave? ................................... 56 
  4.3.1. Austrian Wahlrechtsreform ............................................................. 56 
  4.3.2. Three Bills in the United Kingdom ................................................. 57 
  4.3.3. Bill C-261 in Canada ....................................................................... 60 
  4.3.4. Other Recent Developments ............................................................ 61 
  4.3.5. Some Remarks on the Possibility of a Fourth Wave ....................... 62 
 4.4. Mechanics of Voting Age Reductions and the Four-Step Test .................... 63 
CHAPTER 5 
The Turkish Case ............................................................................................................ 65 
 5.1. Educating the Youth..................................................................................... 66 
 5.2. A Moderate Reduction ................................................................................. 67 
 5.3. Politicized, Organized, Disenfranchised ...................................................... 70 
 5.4. A Very Late Recognition ............................................................................. 72 
 5.5. Ignoring the Demand from Below ............................................................... 75 
CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 77 
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 80 
 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1 .......... First two decades of the third wave of voting age reduction ............................ 53 
Table 2 .......... Voting age requirements for 76 countries in 2001 ............................................ 55 
Table 3 .......... Freedom ratings for 8 countries with voting ages above eighteen in 2001 ....... 55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 Changes in the voting age in Europe 
Figure 1.1 ...... in the first half of the twentieth century ............................................................ 43 
 Changes in the voting age in Europe 
Figure 1.2 ...... in the second half of the twentieth century ....................................................... 44 
Figure 2 ......... Changes in the voting age average worldwide (1814-1997) ............................. 47  
 A comparision between the voting age averages in Europe 
Figure 3 ......... and Latin America (1814-1997) ........................................................................ 48 
 Percentage of the number of changes in voting age  
Figure 4.1 ...... in the electoral systems on a yearly basis (1900-1997) ..................................... 51 
 Percentage of changes in voting age in European and North American   
Figure 4.2 ...... electoral systems on a yearly basis (1900-1997) ............................................... 51 
 
 A comparison between the votes on two bills to lower the voting age  
Figure 5 ......... to sixteen at the House of Commons of the United Kingdom .......................... 59 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Introduction: “No Child’s Play” 
 
 
 
 
Democratic institutions “incorporate and exclude” individuals: they define a 
limited set of agents who are “accepted as valid participants in … decision-making 
processes”1. “Valid participants” of an electoral system constitute the electorate and the 
boundaries of the electorate are set via voting requirements. The most common, if not 
the only universal, one among the current voting requirements is voting age
2
.  
Voting age is as old as democracy. It was eighteen in Ancient Athens and above 
twenty for centuries until the twentieth century
3
. In the past, age-based exclusion has 
been regarded so natural that it has been utilized to support further exclusion. George H. 
Haynes, to support literacy tests, has written in 1898 that “„participating in his 
government‟ is no child’s play: it calls for a moderate degree of intelligence, with the 
power to learn at first”4. Today, many restrictions which had been considered parallel to 
voting age are abolished. However, voting age continues to exclude a large portion of 
society from the franchise. 
                                                 
1
 Guillermo O‟Donnell, “Delegative Democracy” in The Global Resurgence of 
Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996), 96. 
2
 André Blais, Louis Massicotte and Antoine Yoshinaka, “Deciding who has the Right 
to Vote: a Comparative Analysis of Election Laws”, Electoral Studies 20 (2001), 43. 
3
 Mehmet Ö. Alkan, “Türkiye‟de Seçim Sistemi Tercihinin Misyon Boyutu ve 
Demokratik Gelişime Etkileri: Siyaset Bilimi ve Siyaset Sosyolojisi Yaklaşımıyla”, 
Anayasa Yargısı 23 (2006), 135. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism, Hobbes to Locke, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 124; 130. 
Malcolm Crook, Elections in the French Revolution: an Apprenticeship in Democracy, 
1789-1799, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11; 83; 103; 117. 
4
 George H. Haynes, “Educational Qualifications for the Suffrage in the United States”, 
Political Science Quarterly 13, no. 3 (September 1898), 512. Emphasis added. 
2 
 
Political science literature has a long history of interest in the question of voting 
age. Although it is impossible to find the first academic debate on the issue, it can be 
safely claimed that it is not later than 1975. In that year, Francis Schrag‟s article, “The 
Child‟s Status in the Democratic State”, a critique of Carl Cohen‟s book, Democracy, 
was published in the Political Theory journal, together with Cohen‟s response5.  
What has made Schrag to publish another article on the issue almost thirty years 
after the first one is that legal and academic proposals concerning the voting age are still 
being produced
6
. Since 1910s, it is hard to find any decade without voting age changes 
in several countries
7
. Any debate concerning the voting age forces the parties of the 
debate to reconsider what we expect from a voter, what the function of an electorate is, 
what makes democracy legitimate and, finally, why „adults‟ should vote while 
„children‟ should not. Some scholars consider the case of „children‟ as an integral part 
of democracy to build the rest of the theory on while others try to answer the last 
question via describing the founding principles of democracy. One of the most 
important theories among the latter type is that offered by Robert A. Dahl in Democracy 
and Its Critics and more briefly in On Democracy. 
Dahl justifies exclusion of „children‟ from demos by arguing that democracy “can 
be justified only on the assumption that ordinary people are, in general, qualified to 
govern themselves”8. His „categorical principle‟ states that all citizens have to be 
included in demos while „contingent principle‟ limits this inclusion to those who have 
capacity for moral autonomy. The „modified categorical principle‟ Dahl generates by 
combining these two leads him to expect democracy to exclude „children‟9.  
There is a striking gap between Dahl‟s theoretical arguments and his practical 
conclusion that „children‟ can be unquestionably excluded from demos. Like many 
other theorists who have attempted at analyzing the status of „children‟ in democracy, 
                                                 
5
 Francis Schrag, “The Child‟s Status in the Democratic State”, Political Theory 3, no. 4 
(November 1975), 441-457. Carl Cohen, “On the Child‟s Status in the Democratic 
State: A Response to Mr. Schrag”, Political Theory 3, no. 4 (November 1975), 458-463. 
6
 Francis Schrag, “Children and Democracy: Theory and Policy”, Politics, Philosophy 
and Economics 3, no. 3 (2004), 365-379. 
7
 Katz, Democracy and Elections, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 218-
229. 
8
 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1989), 79. 
9
 Ibid, 122-9. 
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Dahl does not have any objective data to prove children‟s inability to self-government. 
Above all he, like others, lacks an objective definition of „childhood‟. Even the 
possibility of such a definition is highly questionable.  
Thus it is highly problematical to exclude an age group from demos merely on 
their being called “children” by others. The history of voting age reveals that as the 
relevant laws change, age groups once deemed „children‟ gain the right to vote and 
come to be considered „adults‟. This alone shows that attempting to define democracy 
in relation to such contestable terms as „adulthood‟ and „childhood‟ weakens the 
conclusions to be made. If Dahl‟s conception of personal capacity for moral autonomy 
is to be utilized to justify age-based exclusion, the issue needs to be liberated from this 
controversial terminology.  
To reach this end, this thesis offers a model which consists of four conditions for 
enfranchisement: community membership, need for representation of interests, 
competence, and régime stability. This thesis claims that a group is excluded from 
demos when the decision makers think that the members of the group cannot satisfy one 
or more conditions of this test. This has been the case for women and lower socio-
economic groups in the past. Age-based exclusion is in consistency with this four-step 
test, too. Dahl‟s theory, while denying the validity of the second and fourth conditions 
of the test, excludes groups that do not satisfy the first and the third. The connection 
between his version of the test and his conclusion that „children‟ can be excluded from 
demos is questioned in this thesis and it is shown that „adult‟ is a term that notifies one‟s 
inclusion in demos rather than the reason to include that person. It is also shown that 
Western democracies act in accordance with Dahl‟s version of the test (with its 
theoretical claims rather than its conclusion on the status of „children‟) while some other 
electoral régimes do not, as can be observed in the Turkish case. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Justifications for Exclusion from Demos: the Four-Step Test 
 
 
 
 
Voting requirements have emerged simultaneously with the Ancient Greek 
electorate after what Robert Dahl names the “first transformation”10. There appears no 
significant difference between the voting requirements in Attica and those in the 
European electoral systems of the Enlightenment Era despite the fact that the 
differences between ancient and modern democracies are often emphasized by political 
thinkers of various views
11. Naming the system „demokratia‟ did not change the fact 
that in Ancient Athens “„the many‟ were in actual fact rather few while those who were 
excluded were ... rather many”12: the women, children, slaves, and outsiders could not 
vote in Ancient Greece
13
. The women, children, servants, beggars, the poor and the 
outsiders were excluded from the franchise in England traditionally
14
. Similar 
exclusions applied to the time of the American Declaration of Independence and Italian 
                                                 
10
 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 13-23. 
11
 Sheldon S. Wolin, “Democracy: Electoral and Athenian”, PS: Political Science and 
Politics 26, no.3 (September 1993): 475-7. Alasdair MacIntyre, “Politics, Philosophy 
and the Common Good” in The MacIntyre Reader, ed. Kelvin Knight (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 241. Charles Tilly, Democracy, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 27. 
12
 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 318. 
13
 Simon Hornblower, “Creation and Development of Democratic Institutions in 
Ancient Greece” in Democracy: The Unfinished Journey: 508 BC to AD 1993, ed. John 
Dunn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 12. 
14
 The Putney debates of 1648, where the voting requirements have been discussed in 
detail between Oliver Cromwell, the Levellers and other prominent figures of the time, 
provides us with an important example of their conception of the franchise. For an 
extract from the debates, see “Members of the New Model Army and Civilian Levellers. 
Extract from the Debates at the General Council of the Army, Putney. 29 October 1647” 
in The English Levellers, ed. Andrew Sharp, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 102-30. 
5 
 
city-states
15
. The history of the electorate since the seventeenth century has been the 
stage for continuous expansion and equalization in terms of the right to vote
16
.  
 
 
 
2.1. Servants and the Poor 
 
 
 
Finding the appropriate criteria to distinguish between citoyens actifs and 
citoyens passifs was a controversial issue after the French Revolution
17
, during the 
Constitutional Convention of the newborn United States
18
 and even as early as the 
Putney Debates on 29 October 1647
19
. In the Putney Debates, the bottom line of the 
discussion on equality amongst men was including “those that have the meanest local 
interest – that man that has but forty shillings a year” for Ireton20. Even Maximilian 
Petty, one of the defenders of the loosening of the voting restrictions, has made his 
conclusion by saying 
                                                 
15
 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 63. 
Tilly, Democracy, 28. 
16
 Katz, Democracy and Elections, 236-7. For a figure of the expansion of British 
electorate from 1831 onwards, see Dahl, On Democracy, 24. For a similar figure for the 
United States, see Tilly, Democracy, 98. 
17
 Crook, Elections in the French Revolution: an Apprenticeship in Democracy, 1789-
1799, 30-5. During the debates of the Comité de Constitution in the Revolutionary 
France, the terms citoyens actifs and citoyens passifs referred to those who had the right 
to vote and those who did not respectively.  
18
 Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the 
United States, (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 20. Benjamin Franklin once wrote: 
“Today a man owns a jackass worth fifty dollars and he is entitled to vote; but before 
the next election the jackass dies ... and the man cannot vote. Now gentlemen, pray 
inform me, in whom is the right of suffrage? In the man or in the jackass?” (quoted in 
Keyssar, 3). 
19
 “Members of the New Model Army and Civilian Levellers. Extract from the Debates 
at the General Council of the Army, Putney. 29 October 1647”, 103-23. 
20
 Ibid, 104. 
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“I conceive the reason why we would exclude apprentices, or servants, 
or those that take alms, is because they depend upon the will of other 
men and should be afraid to displease them. For servants and 
apprentices, they are included in their masters, and so for those that 
receive alms from door to door; but if there be any general way taken 
for those that are not so bound to the will of other men, it would be 
well.”21 
The argument that the poor and the propertyless lack necessary autonomy was 
repeated while the property and taxpaying requirements were being discussed in the 
United States. Predecessors of the defenders of these fiscal requirements in the United 
States can be found in England: Sir William Blackstone‟s justification for excluding 
“persons „in so mean a situation‟ that they had „no will of their own‟ was repeated 
endlessly during the revolutionary era”22. 
Arguments for fiscal requirements do not show much difference between France 
and the United States in the eighteenth century. While the first constitution of the 
Revolutionary France was being formed, necessity for a taxpaying requirement was 
defended by French politicians because “the beggars” would not be “immune from 
corruption” and the requirement would attach “citizens to the state by means of the 
contribution which they make to society‟s well-being”23.  
Another argument against abolishing the property requirements was that “in future 
times a great majority of the people” would not own “any sort of property” and 
enfranchising them would endanger the future of democracy because it would lead to a 
rule by “the landless proletariat of the future”24. This argument, again, is a continuation 
of the almost unanimous concern in the Putney Debate for maintaining order via 
limiting the exercise of the “birthright” to those who have a “livelihood” and 
“permanent interest” in the kingdom25. 
                                                 
21
 Ibid, 130. 
22
 Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United 
States, 10.  
23
 Crook, Elections in the French Revolution: an Apprenticeship in Democracy, 1789-
1799, 32. 
24
 Ibid, 12. 
25
 “Members of the New Model Army and Civilian Levellers. Extract from the Debates 
at the General Council of the Army, Putney. 29 October 1647”, 108. For a detailed 
analysis of the Putney debate on the conditions of losing or maintaining the birthright, 
7 
 
Although they have caused many disagreements and were abolished by some 
states, property requirements existed until the middle of the nineteenth century in the 
United States while being gradually lowered
26
. Taxpayer requirements were in practice 
until they were banned in 1964, the same year in which the Twenty-Fourth Amendment 
(which banned poll taxes) reached the “necessary number” of state ratifications27. All 
economic requirements were abolished in France and the United Kingdom towards the 
end of the nineteenth century, although plural voting through “a business franchise and 
university representation was tolerated” in the latter until 195028.   
Arguments for excluding the propertyless or the poor from the franchise 
emphasize two points: (a) if an individual is dependent on another, he loses his 
“birthright” to participate in the decision-making process since he will be under the 
influence of others, (b) an individual cannot be entitled to participate in the political 
decision-making of a society if he does not become a part of that society by 
contribution. The former presupposes that not owning a certain degree of property 
symbolizes one‟s ability to express (or possibly even to have) his own views. The latter 
restricts the membership in the community further from living within it. In addition to 
these, policymakers have often tried to maintain stability of the régime via excluding 
the poor and the propertyless. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
see Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Hobbes to Locke, 
107-59. 
26
 Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United 
States, 17-8; 51-3. 
27
 Katz, Democracy and Elections, 228. John R. Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional 
Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues 1789-1995 (Santa Barbara: 
ABC-CLIO, Inc, 1996), 321. 
28
 Katz, Democracy and Elections, 221. David Butler, “Electoral Reform”. 
Parliamentary Affairs 57, no. 4 (2004), 735; 738. Butler notes that the 1885 
Amendment to the Representation of the People Act “provide[d] votes for all men” 
whereas Richard Katz gives the year of 1918 as the date when the economic criteria 
were abolished, in his Democracy and Elections, 228. The UK Electoral Commission‟s 
2003 report gives the same date (The Electoral Commission, How Old is Old Enough? 
The Minimum Age of Voting and Candidacy in UK Elections. (London: The Electoral 
Commission, July 2003), 12). This date coincides with what Samuel P. Huntington calls 
“the first wave of democratization” (1820s-1920s). See his “Democracy‟s Third Wave” 
in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3. 
8 
 
 
2.2. Women’s Suffrage 
 
 
 
Arguments for women‟s suffrage appeared long before they were reflected in 
legislations. Condorcet is known to be a dedicated supporter of including women in the 
electorate in the eighteenth century while even Robespierre was limiting his attack on 
voting requirements to male suffrage
29
. A few decades after John Stuart Mill has written 
The Subjection of Women and supported the women‟s then unsuccessful struggle for 
suffrage in England, two other countries (Australia and Finland) enfranchised women
30
. 
Austria, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands and Norway followed these two countries in 
the first two decades of the twentieth century
31
. The United States prohibited exclusions 
based on gender with the Nineteenth Amendment in 1919
32
. 
Although women constitute roughly the half of any country‟s population, they 
have had their right to vote “decades after men” except for some cases33. Women‟s 
struggle for suffrage in the United States was nested with the anti-slavery movement for 
a very long time and suffragist women have witnessed the abolition of slavery
34
. 
Angelina Grimké, an important figure of the anti-slavery movement has given a speech 
in 1848 to the Massachusetts legislative and said  
                                                 
29
 Crook, Elections in the French Revolution: an Apprenticeship in Democracy, 1789-
1799, 35. 
30
 Mary Lyndon Shanley, “The Subjection of Women” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Mill, ed. John Skorupski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 396-422. 
Katz, Democracy and Elections, 218; 221. 
31
 Ibid, 218-29. 
32
 Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and 
Amending Issues 1789-1995, 218. 
33
 Tilly, Democracy, 64. 
34
 Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United 
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“because [slavery] is a political subject, it has often been said, that 
women had nothing to do with it. Are we aliens because we are 
women? Are we bereft of citizenship because we are mothers, wives 
and daughters of a mighty people? Have women no country –no 
interests staked in public weal –no liabilities in common peril –no 
partnership in a nation‟s guilt and shame?”35  
This speech points to an important element of the arguments against women‟s 
political rights: that politics do not concern women. Not only in the United States, but, 
for example, in Sweden, this view was dominant for some time
36. Women‟s economic 
dependency on men made Blackstone‟s argument valid for them too: they “could not be 
responsible political actors”. Moreover, since they were related to men one way or 
another, their interests could be “defended by the men in their families”37. “In all 
species which form unions of any degree of permanence” the male defends the female 
and children, it could not be thought that women were oppressed because they could not 
vote
38
. 
Another argument against women‟s enfranchisement was that since women could 
vote more easily in the towns, it would lead to an injustice between urban and rural 
areas and women‟s suffrage would grant superiority to the former over the latter39.  
Suffragist women have emphasized that the right to vote was natural and “if the 
propertyless (who also had been viewed as dependent) could vote,” it made no sense to 
exclude women from the franchise on the basis that they were dependent or were not 
full members of American society
40
. Since the right to vote was inherent in citizenship, 
suffragists pointed out the injustice in denying the right to vote to a large portion of 
                                                 
35
 Elizabeth Frost-Knappman & Kathryn Cullen-DuPont, Women’s Suffrage in America, 
(New York: Facts On File, 2005), 21. 
36
 Stefan Olsson, “Children‟s Suffrage: A Critique of the Importance of Voters‟ 
Knowledge for the Well-Being of Democracy”, The International Journal of Children’s 
Right 16 (2008), 58.  
37
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38
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39
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40
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citizens. Susan B. Anthony has warned that rejecting the equation of citizenship to the 
right to vote would lead to the exclusion of “one and another class of citizens”41. 
A federal judge, in response to women‟s demand for the vote, claimed that the 
possible negative effects of recognizing women‟s claim to the right to vote are “decisive 
that the right does not exist”42. Suffragists‟ answer to this stance was promoting tax 
rebellions among women with property: in other words, increasing the negative effects 
of not recognizing these claims
43
. 
All these arguments against enfranchising women can be summarized in four 
points: political issues do not concern women‟s interests; their interests can be 
represented by their husbands and fathers; their dependence on men shows that they 
cannot be responsible political actors; and their inclusion might create a negative effect 
on the electoral system. 
 
 
 
2.3. Literacy Tests 
 
 
 
John Stuart Mill, in his book Considerations on Representative Government 
(1861), states that the voter was to be required to be able to read, write and perform 
basic arithmetic. To be just, society had to guarantee that every person can afford “the 
means of attaining these elementary requirements”. Provided one has these means, he 
had no right to complain if he is excluded because he does not have these qualities. 
Moreover, if society provides every person with an education on “natural and political 
divisions of the earth” and the general and local history, these should be added to the 
elementary requirements mentioned above
44
.  
                                                 
41
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44
 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (London: The 
Electric Book, 2001), 164-6. 
11 
 
Exclusion of the illiterate from the electorate of the United States lasted until a 
century after Mill‟s book was published. The literacy tests were declared illegal by “the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the 1970 Voting Rights Amendments”45.  
A typical scholarly defense for the literacy tests, “Educational Qualifications for 
the Suffrage in the United States” written by George H. Haynes, appeared on the 
September 1898 issue of the Political Science Quarterly. The article refers to a debate 
conducted in the Senate in 1897. After giving the history of the literacy tests in the 
United States up to 1898, Haynes states that “the issue between the advocate and the 
opponent of these educational qualifications ... touches the very nature of suffrage”: do 
all citizens have the natural right to vote, or is it “the legal right of certain classes”46? 
Haynes claims that “even the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” 
are limited for the sake of social life. A criminal‟s rights can be limited by society. 
Similarly, the citizens‟ right to vote has limitations “always of age, usually of sex, 
frequently of property”. The fact that the voting requirements varied from state to state 
to a great extent in the United States then is utilized by Haynes as a proof of the 
rightfulness of questioning the right to suffrage in each polity‟s context. Although the 
community membership arguments for enfranchising the illiterate can also be used for 
women and eighteen year olds, women‟s and eighteen year olds‟ suffrage depends on 
the convictions of the „political people‟ of the United States. As he states that 
participation is “no child‟s play: it calls for a moderate degree of intelligence, with the 
power to learn at first hand”, he defines the qualities of a good citizen as “integrity, 
intelligence, independence of judgment, disinterestedness, a consciousness of the 
citizen‟s debt in the state”. According to him, the literacy tests are based on the idea that 
“having merely filled out twenty-one years of existence” is not enough for the right to 
vote: a voter needs to be at a certain level morality and mental capacity. Thus, the 
literacy tests makes the suffrage “a thing of worth, ... a prize to be sought after”47. 
                                                 
45
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Mill‟s and Haynes‟ support for taking literacy and knowledge as a condition for 
having the right to vote reflects their claim that the individuals who are expected to 
influence the political decision-making process should prove their ability to learn and to 
possess “a moderate degree of intelligence”. In their view, knowledge symbolizes an 
individual‟s capacity to understand the political situation and express his or her views in 
relevance. 
 
 
 
2.4. The Four-Step Test for Enfranchisement 
 
 
 
Justifications for excluding women and lower socio-economic groups from the 
electorate consist of various versions of four essential questions: 
i) Community Membership: Do political decisions influence the members 
of the group? 
ii) Representation of Interests: Do the group‟s interests deserve to be 
represented independently from those who are expected to represent 
them? 
iii) Competence: Are the members of the group capable of identifying the 
influence of political decision-making process on their lives and react to 
this influence? 
iv) Régime Stability: Is including the group in elections more advantageous 
than excluding them for the electoral régime? 
The advocates of exclusion give a negative answer to one or more of these 
questions for a certain group. Women and servants have been conceived to be irrelevant 
to political life. They have been perceived to be already represented (by their husbands, 
fathers, employers and/or masters). Servants‟ dependence on their masters and poor 
individuals‟ inability to have a certain degree of property has been deemed a symbol for 
their failure to have an independent judgment on their interests. Finally their 
enfranchisement was not desired because of its possible negative effects on the electoral 
régime.  
In other words, certain groups were deemed apolitical in the past because they 
could not pass this four-step test for enfranchisement. It is important to note the nature 
of this test here: answers are highly, if not completely, dependent on the answerer‟s 
13 
 
perception of the excluded group. Since the test does not include any objectively 
measurable questions, objective criteria (such as tax-paying, income, gender, literacy 
and knowledge) enable the decision makers to pretend that the answers are given 
objectively. As long as a group does not prove that it passes the four-step test, decision-
makers are free to choose their criterion for measuring individuals‟ situation in terms of 
the test. 
Group demand for being enfranchised signals that the members of the demanding 
group are not apolitical: they are concerned about the influence of political decisions on 
them; they are not satisfied with their supposed representatives; and they are capable of 
contemplating on the situation and of reacting to it. After these three steps are satisfied 
via group demand, decision-makers are left with the fourth question: would recognizing 
this demand destabilize the electoral régime? 
Whether age-based exclusion fits into this picture is an important question if we 
are to understand its mechanics. An analysis of academic debates on voting age is 
necessary if the relationship between the four-step test and voting age is to be 
understood. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Age-Based Exclusion: Justifications, Criticisms and Alternatives 
 
 
 
 
The idea that children do not have a place within the democratic electorate is often 
considered a self-evident, unproblematic, unique exception”48. Many theoretical 
approaches to democracy either take this exclusion as a rule in need for justification, or 
simply a condition to be taken for granted. Even when it is taken for granted, gradual 
maturation of human beings creates an inevitable need for further justifications to any 
proposed age limit
49
. These justifications can rarely escape criticism, if they ever can. 
 
 
 
3.1. Justifications for Age-Based Exclusion 
 
 
 
Almost all adults are enfranchised in the most electoral systems of the world 
today. Exceptions are “numerically small groups like prison inmates, non-citizens and 
mentally deficient persons” and even these exceptions are not universal unlike the age 
restriction
50
. 
                                                 
48
 Olsson, “Children‟s Suffrage: A Critique of the Importance of Voters‟ Knowledge for 
the Well-Being of Democracy”, 55. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 123; 127. 
49
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50
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No justification is needed for any restrictions on the electorate once modern 
democratic régimes are conceived as variants of aristocracy51. If all political 
associations necessitate a class of the ruled, the case of children is hardly interesting. 
But modern democratic systems of rule are thought to diverge from their old and new 
counterparts by not regarding restrictions as natural
52. They take the right to vote as “the 
mark of citizenship”53. Without the right to vote, one “might be described as „socially 
dead‟” in a democracy54. Hence, depriving any individual of the right to participate in 
the political decision making process necessitates justifications.  
As mentioned in the end of the previous chapter, restrictions on the right to vote 
have been justified in reference to a four-step test in the past: (a) community 
membership, (b) representation of interests, (c) competence, and (d) régime stability. 
This scheme can also be used to classify the justifications for age-based exclusion. 
 
 
 
3.1.1. Community Membership and Representation of Interests 
 
 
The case of children differs from that of transients and non-citizens in terms of 
children‟s official ties to the polity since they “are already citizens”55. However, it is 
often argued that children do not deserve the right to vote because they are not full 
members of society and they are not affected from the political decisions as much as 
adults are
56
. One way of arguing this is to say that children should not have the right to 
influence economic policies because they do not earn their own income
57
.  
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It is also argued that children do not have their own interests within the 
community distinct from those of adults
58
. This is an important claim because a demand 
for enfranchising children could be based on Dahl‟s argument for full inclusion of 
adults: that whenever a group of adults is excluded from the decision making process, 
the interests of its members “will be seriously injured by neglect or outright damage”59. 
A Marxist way of approaching the problem supports the argument that children do not 
possess distinct interests since if the main characteristics of social classes are based on 
economic conditions children will hardly be an exception
60
. 
Another important part of the (full) community membership arguments include 
the balance of rights and responsibilities. Although it has been used for reducing the 
voting age in the past, this argument can also be utilized to keep it at a specific level. 
Both Robert Dahl
61
 and Richard Archard
62
 emphasize the importance of balancing the 
political rights with legal responsibilities: individuals must receive their right to vote 
when they are held legally responsible for their actions. 
Moreover, it is pointed out that even sixteen and seventeen year old individuals 
are dependent financially. This also supports the view that children are not full members 
of society because even the VAT they pay because of the “sweets or CDs” they buy is 
not really paid by themselves
63
. This necessitates the parents to act as the 
representatives of their children
64
. Since many older citizens have their own children 
and grandchildren, it is unlikely for them to ignore the interests of children 
completely
65
. 
These views claim that children do not pass the first and/or second steps of the 
four-step test: they do not hold full community membership in a way that political 
decisions are relevant to them and even if they have distinct interests, these interests can 
be rightfully represented by adults. 
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3.1.2. Competence 
 
 
Archard states that being affected by the laws is not enough for being entitled to 
vote while the electorate excludes many groups who have their interests affected by the 
political decisions: not only “temporarily resident foreigners, citizens of other states 
affected by the foreign policy of this government” but also “the unborn”. Moreover, 
granting to an individual the right to vote because she is affected by the decisions 
presupposes her “capacity to recognise” her interests and to vote accordingly. Hence, 
the principle of representation of interests does not eliminate but necessitates 
competence
66
. 
Voting age requirements are found useful because they “delay the full 
membership of those who, by nature,” cannot fulfill the task of voting67. The required 
kind of competence is sometimes defined as “social awareness and responsibility”68.  
An individual‟s interest in politics is taken to be an important criterion for being 
politically mature
69
. Low turnout rates among the youth are often taken to be a sign of 
how “apathetic and civically unaware” they are70. Knowledge of politics is utilized as 
an important indicator of political maturity
71
. Educating the youth on this issue is 
deemed a tool to encourage political participation
72
. Not only the ability to differentiate 
one party or candidate from another, but also identifying oneself with a political party is 
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considered an important criterion
73
. Studies have shown in the past that, at least in the 
early stages of their education, children do not recognize differences between political 
parties
74
. Even though children can adopt a political stance even in the early stages of 
their lives
75, some theorists argue that this is not rooted in children‟s capability of 
contemplating on politics but in their desire to please their parents. Since their political 
stance is dependent on their parents, they cannot be expected to develop their own 
views on their interests
76
. 
Another line of logic comes from Cohen‟s distinction between rational capacity 
and intellectual ability. This distinction leads him to claim that children lack the right to 
vote not because they lack education or necessary knowledge, i.e. intellectual ability, 
but because they lack “certain fundamental kinds of thinking”, i.e. rational capacity, and 
“they cannot operate [a democracy] at all”77. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.3. Régime Stability 
 
 
In addition to those mentioned above, it is also assumed that it is unnecessary to 
change an already functioning arrangement
78
. Although this argument does not find 
much scholarly support, it has often been used by parliamentarians in the past, as it can 
be seen in the coming chapters. Moreover, Dahl also mentions the importance of 
offering an acceptable inclusion and current setting appears to be acceptable for our 
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time
79
. The widespread consensus on eighteen as the voting age (and as the end of 
childhood, according to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) leads scholars 
and parliamentarians to be reluctant about changing the existing voting age 
regulations
80
.  
Another argument referring to the concerns about the stability of electoral régimes 
is that the low turnout rates among the youth threaten the future of democracy since “all 
democratic theories regard spontaneously high turnout as desirable”81. 
 
 
 
3.1.4. Temporariness of Age-Based Exclusion 
 
 
There is an exceptional justification for age-based exclusion which has no 
parallelism with any of those utilized for excluding certain groups in the past: that 
children will join the electorate when they are mature enough and thus that this is not a 
real exclusion. Since women were obviously excluded permanently and it has never 
been guaranteed that the propertyless will eventually gain some property, this 
justification maintains to be unique for children‟s case82. However, it is obvious that 
children‟s eventual enfranchisement does not justify their exclusion per se.  
 
 
 
 
3.2. Criticisms for Justifications 
 
 
 
Existence of any age restriction on the right to vote is criticized on the basis that 
democracy is based on the idea of equality among everybody
83. “And everybody means 
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everybody”84. The grounds of these criticisms can be analyzed in a more systematical 
manner by using the same framework as the previous section. 
 
 
 
3.2.1. Community Membership and Representation of Interests 
 
 
The importance of interests is emphasized in various articles of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The first set of criticisms towards the exclusion 
of children is that their interests are in danger within current context. These criticisms 
can be divided into two different arguments: children‟s interests can individually differ 
from those of adults, and their group interests cannot be represented by adults. 
If the right to vote is a tool for protecting a person‟s interests, exclusion of any 
child from the franchise might result in the policymakers‟ ignoring her interests. “To 
claim that politics does not involve children,” states Olsson, “is to assume that children 
are a people of their own”85. 
Since children are excluded from franchise because of their being members of a 
definite group, most of the criticisms based on representation of interests are based on 
their differences from adults. Adequate education, as recognized in the Article 28 of the 
UN Convention, is an important part of the interests of children which differs from that 
of the adults
86
. Consideration of possible conflicts between the interests of children and 
those of their parents and grandparents raises serious problems concerning the parents‟ 
ability to act as the representatives of their children. This problem arises when “welfare 
expenditures on the elderly and children” are compared, as done by Peterson: a 
comparison between the poverty among “the elderly and among the children [in the 
United States, reveals that it has] been changing at roughly the same rate but in opposite 
directions” between 1975 and 199087. 
Another important difference between the young and the elderly concerns their 
living conditions and this difference leads to different interests. Adolescents and young 
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adults are preoccupied with survival and building their future lives rather than having a 
stable life in a given electoral district for a long time and spending time for 
enrollment
88
. Their high mobility (rooted in their need for moving often for the sake of 
education and employment) is considered a structural obstacle before their ability to 
enroll for vote even when they have the right to franchise
89
. This might be an important 
factor that leads to lower enrollment and turnout rates among the youth in many 
countries including the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, despite the 
fact that enrollment is compulsory in Australia and children go through a civics 
education in these countries
90
. But there is no consensus on this view. For instance, 
Highton and Wolfinger (in their study of the American electorate) reach the conclusion 
that, although mobility is highly influential on voting, there appears no remarkable 
difference in terms of mobility between age groups. Low voter turnout cannot be solely 
based on the difference between life conditions of the young and their elders according 
to them. Their study reveals that voter turnout increases with age in the United States, 
regardless of the youth‟s preoccupiation with education, employment, leaving parents, 
marriage, home ownership and mobility
91
. Two possible explanations for this can be 
accumulation of political experience and generational difference
92
. 
The argument that the interests of children are not affected as much as those of 
adults are is also criticized from another angle. Since their life expectancy is longer than 
that of adults and the elderly, decisions resulting in future debts and environmental 
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problems affect children to a greater extent. This creates an intergenerational injustice, 
as Philippe van Parijs names it
93
. Although it is obvious that the unborn cannot have the 
right to vote
94
, the possibility that the elderly might use their electoral power to “benefit 
their unavoidably short-term self-interest” necessitates solutions to balance this power 
via giving more electoral power to the children
95
. 
Balance of rights and responsibilities is a central point for the justifications of the 
age-based exclusion. The facts that children do not earn their own income or they do not 
serve in the military are often utilized to show that children are not full members of the 
community. The former is criticized on the grounds that many elderly, despite their 
right to vote, neither contribute to the economy of the country nor earn income. The 
latter is thought to be in contradiction with the fact that women were enfranchised in the 
United States while they were not being drafted for the military service
96
. This is indeed 
the current case for Turkey. Moreover, the argument of balance of rights and 
responsibilities can well be an important tool for demanding voting age reduction when 
certain rights are given at an age lower than the voting age. Sixteen years old age limit 
concerning the rights to “leave school, get married, join the armed forces” and the 
responsibility to pay tax can be taken as a sign of regarding those older than sixteen as 
adults
97
. However, the idea of having age limits for all rights and responsibilities in 
unison is not always found convincing unless the equalized age limits refer to similar 
capabilities
98
. Capabilities, of course, bring in the issue of competence. 
 
 
 
3.2.2. Competence 
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Justifications based on children‟s competence are under serious criticism in the 
literature from various angles. The first important set of criticisms arises from the 
vagueness of the concept of “competence” as well as of “childhood” and “adulthood”. 
As mentioned above children are regarded incompetent to vote because of their lack of 
ability to have political reasoning. The criticisms towards this argument can be divided 
into two separate but complementary arguments: difficulty in limiting this inability to 
children, and implications of expecting too much competence from electorate. 
When competence is not based on the capacity for autonomy (or “rational 
capacity” or “minimal competence” as it is called by Cohen and Christiano 
respectively), serious problems appear concerning the measurement of competence. It is 
reported that many children have political views earlier than they have the vote. The 
difference between the degrees of maturity individuals achieve arises from the gradual 
nature of human maturation
99
. Political reasoning, which is different from rational 
capacity, develops very late in the course of a person‟s life, if it ever does. Thus the lack 
of political reasoning cannot constitute a basis for the exclusion of children
100
.  
If one insists on the validity of competence for the right to vote, critics emphasize 
the widespread incompetence amongst adult voters. Previous research shows a serious 
lack of knowledge on politics for adults
101. As Larry Bartels puts it, “the political 
ignorance of the American voter is one of the best-documented features of 
contemporary democracy”102. This logically implies that if lack of competence is an 
obstacle on the right to vote per se, a serious part of the adult electorate should be 
disenfranchised via a test of competence or increasing the voting age. However, this is 
not necessary for several reasons and at least one of them seems valid for those who are 
even younger than eighteen: representative democracy transfers the concerns of 
competence from the domain of political rights to the electoral process and this creates 
“shortcuts to knowledge”. A voter does not need to understand all the complexity of the 
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risks and decisions. All she needs to do is to delegate a representative for doing this for 
her
103
.  
 
 
 
3.2.3. Régime Stability 
 
 
Low turnout rates among the youth are another proposed basis for the exclusion of 
children and young adolescents, at least of those below a certain age limit. Since the 
“degree of non-participation is becoming increasingly troubling”, there are concerns 
that the low turnout rates for the incoming cohort might influence the future of 
democracy
104
. It is even proposed to introduce fines for the young voters who do not 
“show up at elections” or poll tax for the elderly105. 
Although many methods are being experimented for the sake of encouragement 
and education of the youth for political participation, turnout rate remains to be in a 
positive correlation with age when eighteen year old and slightly older voters are 
compared with their elders
106
. The gap between politicians and young people is thought 
to be an important source for this problem. As Edwards shows, presidential campaigns 
in Australia, with their emphasis on family values and interest rates, do not appeal to the 
youth
107
. Some politicians seem to consult with the youth but the democratic way to 
make politicians worry about a group‟s interests is to give that group the right to vote 
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which “threatens a politician‟s job and livelihood”108. Since the voters between eighteen 
and early twenties inevitably constitute a small minority when compared to the 
numerical superiority of the rest, emphasis on the concerns and interests of the adults 
appears to be a plausible way to attract more voters, especially in countries with older 
populations
109
. A proposed solution to this problem is to have each age group elect its 
own representatives or to promote political parties which receive more votes from the 
youngest group of voters
110
. 
Another possible source for the youth‟s low participation is the structural (or 
institutional) and social obstacles
111
. Although these cannot be fully explanatory, they 
beyond doubt play a role in the low turnout rates among the youth
112
. 
It is hard to measure the youth‟s eagerness to participate in the elections solely via 
their current participation rate. Even if they do not vote when these problems are solved, 
the countries where voting is not compulsory might need to accept that “for one to talk 
meaningfully about the right to vote, one must also allow the right to refrain from 
voting”113. 
 
 
 
3.3. Age Criterion 
 
 
 
Provided the justifications for excluding children from the franchise are valid, the 
problem is how to measure whether a person is a „child‟. Specifying the differences 
between children and adults (“the „boundary‟ of childhood”114) is a controversial issue. 
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Scholars do not even agree whether the category of „childhood‟ is universal115. Not only 
adults‟ view of children as a category, but also the adult‟s view of his/her own 
childhood is being questioned
116
. Various scholars point out the increasing distance 
between the behaviors of the adults and children through history
117
. Others claim that 
this distance is diminishing in the contemporary society
118
. Some are so pessimistic on 
the adequacy of the sources that they think the history of childhood “cannot be 
studied”119. 
Age restriction is based on the supposed political immaturity of a portion of the 
citizenry. Even many critics of the current age requirements point out that the youngest 
part of the population cannot be enfranchised
120
. The main problem arises from the 
individual differences between persons‟ degree of maturity and even some advocates of 
the current age restriction acknowledge that “determining a cut-off age for anything is 
an arbitrary decision rather than a moral question”121. There appears a question: can the 
possible injustices rooted in our method of measuring maturity collectively be lowered 
(if not avoided) by a test of competence? 
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3.3.1. Test of Competence: an Alternative? 
 
 
Replacing age requirement with a test of competence has various drawbacks 
among which discrimination cannot be counted since age restriction is already 
discriminatory
122
. Several of these drawbacks are avoidable while others are inherent in 
the method. 
Difficulties arising from illiteracy, language difference and physical 
disadvantages can be solved by producing alternative versions of the test for these 
groups
123
. However, the main disadvantage of utilizing a test of competence arises from 
the inability to come up with an objective set of questions. Any question “will 
presuppose a substantive conception of interests and morality” and both of these should 
be open to debate in a democratic system
124
. If such a test is based on any world-view, it 
might prevent a part of the citizenry from having the right to vote for all their lives just 
because their point of view differs from the producers of the test
125
. This limitation can 
be avoided by using competence tests for those under a certain age (this may be the 
current voting age)
126
, but this does not solve the problem of excluding people based on 
their world-views. Moreover, it could not avoid the basic problem: why give the right to 
vote any person without testing her just because she is older than others? Most of the 
questions asked about the voting age (“how old is old enough?” as indicated in the title 
of the UK Electoral Commission‟s 2003 report127) would not be eliminated by setting a 
test of competence for those under a certain age limit. 
 
 
 
3.4. Proposed Solutions to the Problems 
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3.4.1. Lowering the Current Voting Age 
 
 
Although scholarly debates generally end in a near consensus on the necessity for 
determining a voting age (except for proposals to abolish the age criterion altogether), 
discussion continues on the appropriate age limit. As can be seen in the previous 
sections of this chapter, many arguments supporting the age restriction are based on the 
incapabilities of little children. This leads to many proposals to reduce the current 
voting age. David Archard, for example, acknowledges that “teenagers can be thought 
capable of voting” after explaining the reasons why little children should not have the 
vote
128. Francis Schrag, similarly, states that the main problem with children‟s suffrage 
is that “below a certain age, they would not know what they were doing in the voting 
booth” while he does not want to propose an alternative to the current practice129.  
Moreover, enfranchising the age groups who are still living with their families is 
regarded as a way of balancing the 18-22 age group‟s alienation from the electoral 
process by enfranchising them earlier
130
. This claim is based on the high turnout rates of 
the 16-17 age group in German local elections. In the United Kingdom, civics education 
is completed when the student is sixteen years old. Giving these people the opportunity 
to use what they learn at school immediately might help reducing their alienation from 
the political system
131
. Moreover, some scholars claim that enfranchising people while 
they are still in high school might be a chance to turn students‟ first election into a class 
project and political participation into a collective event
132
. 
Whether local and general elections differ in their suitability for the young 
electorate is another point of controversy. Young people‟s familiarity with the 
happenings of everyday life makes some Schrag to propose enfranchising younger age 
groups for local events such as “school board elections, school bond referenda, and 
similar matters which directly effect their lives”133. This idea is supported by David 
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Archard and the Commission on Local Government Electoral Arrangements in 
Wales
134. Others emphasize children‟s earlier interest in the national and international 
issues and “earlier recognition of national political figures”135. Moreover, Austria‟s 
experience with the national enfranchisement of 16-17 age group following the local 
enfranchisement of them might be an important example of the inability to limit such 
reductions to the local level. 
As mentioned above, Cowley and Denver state that “determining a cut-off age for 
anything is an arbitrary decision rather than a moral question”136. Any reduction in the 
voting age might lead to new discussions based on more or less same assumptions. This 
is why Stefan Olsson finds the proposals to lower the voting age misguided. He offers 
two choices: if competence is not a basis for exclusion, voting age should be abolished 
and even infants should vote via their parents as their representatives. If competence is a 
basis for the suffrage, having the current voting age serves to this end and it makes no 
sense to lower it
137
. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.2. Abolishing the Voting Age (Parents’ Vote) 
 
 
There are exceptions to the mainstream approach to the disenfranchisement of 
little children and these exceptions, since they neither take it for granted nor attempt to 
justify it, offer to change the status-quo to a large extent
138
. Provided one aims at 
eliminating all limitations on the right to vote, any proposal to abolish the voting age 
leads to the problem of little children. Since parents are already acting as the 
representatives of their children within Western legal systems, some scholars argue, 
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they can also be granted the right to vote in the name of their children
139
. This method 
was proposed to the parliaments of some European countries several times from the end 
of the nineteenth century to recent years
140
. 
The main limitation to parents‟ vote arises from the possible conflicts between the 
interests of children and parents. It is true that parents act as the representatives of their 
children in many ways but in the political sphere there might be proposals that children 
will benefit from whereas the financial burden on the parents will be increased. 
However, if the older children have the right to vote on their own and the parents‟ vote 
is limited to the youngest children, the “conflicts of interest ... might loom less large”. 
Moreover, there is a probability that this practice might encourage “poor, young, 
uneducated parents” to vote by giving them extra weight in the electoral process141. 
 
 
 
3.4.3. A Guardian for the Interests of Children 
 
 
Another proposal to avoid intergenerational injustice is to appoint a guardian 
whose sole aim is to protect the interests of children or even coming generations. This 
method is currently used in many European countries such as Ireland, Sweden, Finland, 
Poland and Iceland as well as the states of Washington and Michigan in the US.  
Although appointing a representative for the collective interests of children seems 
to solve the problem of intergenerational injustice to some degree, it involves serious 
problems within democratic understanding. First of all, it should be questioned who 
appoints this representative. The answer to this question is that the representative will 
be appointed by adults, from a set of adults, for children. Hence, a guardian (or an 
ombudsman) for children still stands on the assumption that adults can represent the 
interests of children and any problem concerning the conflict of interest between these 
two groups makes this practice more questionable. Moreover, ombudsmanship takes 
children as a group with collective interests subject to objective assessment. This might 
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be true to some degree but it is equally logical to claim that the idea of having a single 
representative for the interests of all children, no matter how powerful she is, ignore the 
differences between the interests of individuals
142
. 
 
 
 
3.5. Voting Age and the Four-Step Test for Enfranchisement 
 
 
 
This chapter so far has analyzed the academic debates on the voting age issue in 
terms of justifications, criticisms, and proposed alternatives. It must be clear by now 
that age-based exclusion is no exception to the validity of the four-step test for 
enfranchisement. The case of children is taken into consideration by scholars in 
accordance with the four conditions of the test: community membership, representation 
of interests, competence and régime stability. Probably the only exception for this 
scheme is the temporariness of exclusion: in contrast with formerly excluded groups, 
children eventually join demos when they are mature enough. However, this is not a 
justification in itself. It needs to be supported by an argument that clarifies the 
difference in the political capabilities of children and adults. None of the arguments at 
hand can provide this clarification independently from the four-step test. 
The four-step test, as explained in the previous chapter, fails to give objective 
criteria: it necessitates proxy measurements. Age turns out to be just another useful 
proxy for measuring the political capabilities of a supposedly apolitical group. It has to 
be admitted that age really is a useful criterion, especially for its objectivity: aging is 
controlled by nature rather than any social or political authority. However, the 
significance of age as a criterion for deciding whether a person should be entitled to 
vote is completely irrelevant to its objectivity. In the end, gender was another objective 
criterion, too. It is also irrelevant to its temporariness: if a person deserves to vote, his 
right to vote cannot be postponed for ten, eighteen or twenty years. 
It is already shown that various scholars discuss the issue of voting age within the 
limited grounds of the four-step test. It is important to see whether this test maintains to 
be valid in accordance with Robert Dahl‟s much respected theory of democratic 
exclusion. 
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3.6. Dahl’s Theory of Democratic Exclusion 
 
 
 
Robert A. Dahl‟s Democracy and Its Critics is written “to construct an argument 
that would draw on the widest possible body of democratic ideas and experiences” and 
its influence is reflected in many scholarly reviews and books
143
. The attempt of this 
book must not be confused with, for instance, that of Polyarchy: Participation of 
Opposition, which focuses on democratic systems of our time (i.e. “polyarchies”) and 
transitions towards such systems
144
.  
Dahl defines democracy as opposed to its two alternatives: “anarchy” and 
“guardianship”. He states that “any further exploration of democratic idea” necessitates 
the objections arising from these two alternatives to be “satisfactorily met”145.  
“The vision of anarchism”, according to Dahl, is “a society without a state”146. 
This leaves all non-democratic forms of government under the title of guardianship. He 
virtually
147
 handles the issue of guardianship in two chapters, in the first of which he 
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narrates a dialogue between two fictional characters: Aristos and Demo
148
. At the 
beginning of the dialogue, Aristos claims that democratic and non-democratic views are 
not wholly opposed to each other. On the contrary, they share three assumptions: 
a) Necessity for a state: This assumption is mainly a non-anarchist one. It gives 
the difference between anarchism and willingness to live within a political 
order
149
. 
b) Ideal of giving equal consideration to the interests of all human beings: This 
assumption cannot be an umbrella assumption for both democratic and non-
democratic systems since it is not even commonly accepted by non-
democratic systems alone, as Aristos accepts
150
. This ideal can even be 
utilized for rejecting a non-democratic system of rule, let alone justifying 
it
151
. 
c) Restriction of “the process of governing the state to those who are qualified”: 
Aside from references to the democracies of the past, Aristo‟s most important 
proof for this assumption is that children “are still excluded from full 
citizenship”152. Women, the illiterate, the poor, and many others are not 
excluded from the franchise anymore
153
. Exclusion of military servicemen is 
not currently a universal practice although it exists in many countries
154
. This 
causes children to be the largest group without the right to vote universally in 
democratic régimes155.  
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Since the first assumption is necessary for any type of political order and the 
second cannot even be generalized for non-democratic systems of rule, third assumption 
appears to be the only universal parallelism between democratic and non-democratic 
systems within Dahl‟s theoretical framework. 
 
 
 
3.6.1. Guardianship Arguments 
 
 
Restricting the decision-making process to the qualified appears to be common for 
democratic and non-democratic systems of rule. However, Dahl first explains non-
democratic arguments for guardianship and then refutes them
156
. He then explains the 
arguments for democratic exclusion
157
.  
Aristos gives three qualities which will altogether turn an individual into an ideal 
guardian for a non-democratic state: 
a) Moral competence: Being educated for having an “adequate understanding of 
the proper ends, goals, and objectives that the government should strive to 
reach”158. Dahl criticizes this criterion by questioning the existence of 
“objectively true moral judgments”. Moreover, he asks why these judgments 
cannot be taught to everybody provided that they exist
159
. He also questions 
guardians‟ superiority in knowing the common good160. Another criticism is 
raised against this argument by Carl Cohen: such knowledge can be acquired 
only after one is able to participate in the decision making process
161
. 
b) Virtue: Willingness to realize these “proper ends” and being educated enough 
to possess this quality
162. Dahl questions the guardians‟ ability to be 
“virtuous” in this sense while they are not accountable to their people163. 
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c) Instrumental competence: Being educated enough to know the “best, most 
efficient, and most appropriate means to achieve” proper ends164. Dahl‟s 
criticism on this quality of the imagined guardians is that empirical 
instrumental knowledge is not enough to reach good decisions
165
. 
All these qualities add up to “political competence”166. Non-democratic logic 
excludes (large) segments of population because these qualities are thought to apply to a 
minority and ordinary people need to be ruled by them
167
. 
Dahl does not deny the importance of political competence for membership in the 
decision-making process. He rather questions the link between these qualities and the 
proposed need for a limited unaccountable minority of guardians. Although Dahl (or 
Demo) does not disregard the importance of these three pillars of non-democratic 
systems of rule, he takes intrinsic equality of people as the basis of his democratic 
theory
168
.  
 
 
 
 
 
3.6.2. Age-Based Exclusion: a Presupposition or a Consequence? 
 
 
Age-based exclusion is not an exception but a rule for some perceptions of 
democracy. Joseph Schumpeter regards the widespread acceptance for this exclusion as 
a basis for excluding certain groups of adults within democracy. Since “the rationale of” 
specifying an age limit for the franchise “also applies to an indefinite number of 
inhabitants above the age limit”, the problem is not whether the observers affirm these 
qualifications. Society‟s judgment is the essence. He emphasizes the importance of 
individuals‟ “intelligent use of the right to vote” and “one‟s ability to support oneself” 
and how various societies can apply these criteria in different ways. A society cannot be 
called undemocratic because of the way it specifies certain qualifications for 
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membership in its demos as long as the demos holds the rule (kratein). It is important 
that his line of argument starts with the statement that exclusion of children is not 
questioned in the contemporary democracies
169
. It is not a result of Schumpeter‟s 
justification, rather a presupposition for it. 
R. G. Collingwood does not see any problem in excluding any group from the 
electorate since  
“every democracy is in part an aristocracy and every aristocracy in part 
a democracy; that every body politic consists of two parts, a politically 
active or ruling class  and a politically passive or ruled class, the first 
consisting essentially of persons who are mentally adult and so able to 
rule themselves and others, the second consisting essentially of persons 
who  are not mentally adult and so have to be ruled by the rest; and that 
of these „positive‟ and „negative‟ classes members must always be 
passing from the second to the first. What is important is that the right 
ones should pass.”170 
Aristocracy and democracy are not opposite to each other in this approach. The 
only difference they have is that aristocracy is based on force while democracy is based 
on self-government
171
. Aristocracy restricts the ruling class by excluding every member 
of it who does not contribute to its strength while democracy enlarges its ruling class by 
recruiting every member of the ruled class as long as he or she “might constitute an 
addition to its strength”172. The passage between these two classes is controlled by the 
ruling class
173
. Abolishing the restrictions on the electorate would mean abolishing the 
ruled class in democracy, which would mean the denial of the essence of politics given 
in The New Leviathan. 
Carl Cohen makes a distinction between “rational capacity” and “intellectual 
ability”. Since they possess rational capacity, “the many, stupid, foolish citizens must 
have their right to vote protected”. Their intellectual ability is not an obstacle for this. 
Children, on the other hand, do not have the “rational capacity presupposed by 
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participation” in the early stages of their lives because “human maturation is slow”174. 
Granting the right to vote to children merely because political decisions affect their 
lives
175
 is “false” because they do not fulfill this presupposition176. Excluding children 
from the electorate, in this perception, is a consequence of the theoretical basis of 
democracy. 
Dahl denies Schumpeter‟s above-mentioned relativity by distinguishing between 
two different criteria: (a) whether a system is “democratic in relation to its own demos”; 
(b) and “in relation to everyone subject to its rules”. A system that fulfills the first but 
fails to satisfy the second will be a democracy according to Schumpeter, while Dahl will 
classify it as a guardianship. Putting Schumpeter‟s “nonsolution” aside, he offers a 
situation where one insists that the demos should consist of “every member of the 
association”. He calls this “the categorical principle”177. Still, he regards the case of 
children as a unique exception
178
 in a similar fashion with Katz
179
 and Cohen. This 
exception introduces the contingent principle to democracy which contradicts with the 
categorical principle
180
: some members of the association have to be excluded from the 
demos because they lack some qualities. Although human beings have the potential at 
birth, they develop the necessary qualities afterwards
181
. Once this is accepted as a fact, 
exclusion of children from the demos is a consequence of the necessity to base 
democracy on the presupposition that individuals are able to govern themselves
182
. 
 
 
 
3.6.3. The Contingent Principle: Capacity for Autonomy 
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As can be observed in the analyses of Robert Dahl and Carl Cohen as well as 
many others, competence is a very complicated issue and the term is given various 
meanings. Schrag, for example, groups every personal qualification under the title of 
competence
183
 while David Archard uses the term to define the minimal requirements 
for the right to vote
184
. Dahl makes a distinction between moral competence (knowledge 
on the proper ends) and instrumental competence (possessing knowledge on the 
instruments to reach desired ends) both of which are different from moral autonomy
185
. 
Cohen distinguishes between rational capacity (to conduct proper thinking, similar to 
Dahl‟s capacity for autonomy) and intellectual ability (to make wise decisions)186.  
Moral autonomy, according to Dahl, is what makes human beings “fully human”. 
A morally autonomous person is someone who adopts whatever moral principles he 
wants and makes decisions according to these principles
187
.  
Within Dahl‟s theoretical framework, excluding groups from the demos because 
they lack moral autonomy at the moment would be a circular argument because 
individuals‟ capacity to become morally autonomous can be realized to different extents 
under different systems of rule. What makes democracy desirable is its ability to let the 
members of the demos to realize their capacity
188. The important issue here is one‟s 
capacity for autonomy, not her actual autonomy at any given moment. Thus, “the 
citizen body in a democratically governed state must include all persons subject to the 
laws of that state except transients and persons proved to be incapable of caring for 
themselves”189. 
The contingent principle, as presented by Dahl, is any restriction on the full 
membership in the demos based on competence or autonomy once it is accepted that all 
members of the community deserve a say in the policy-making because of their 
membership. 
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The contingent principle has a long history within democratic theory whereas the 
required qualities have been subject to dispute. Even John Stuart Mill, the author of The 
Subjection of Women and an important protagonist of the expansion of suffrage
190
, was 
a supporter of the contingent principle rather than of the categorical one. He offers to 
restrict the electorate to those who are able to read, write and “perform the common 
operations of arithmetic” while he accepts the ideal of providing everybody with the 
means to achieve these qualities
191
. A similar principle can also be observed in David 
Hume‟s writings. For example, one paragraph from his Enquiry concerning the 
Principles of Morals perfectly defines the case of children as well as other 
disadvantaged groups: 
“Were there a species of creatures, intermingled with men, which 
though rational, were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body 
and mind, that they were incapable of all resistance, and could never, 
upon the highest provocation, make us feel the effects of their 
resentment; the necessary consequence, I think, is, that we should be 
bound, by the laws of humanity, to give gentle usage to these creatures, 
but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with 
regard to them, nor could they possess any right or property, exclusive 
of such arbitrary lords. Our intercourse with them could not be called 
society, which supposes a degree of equality.”192 
Locke, similarly, introduces children as an exception to his argument “that all men 
by nature are equal”. “Children ... are not born in this full state of equality, though they 
are born to it”. As a child matures, his subjection to his parents loosens and he becomes 
“a man at his own free disposal”. Not only children, but slaves are excluded from the 
“civil society” because they have “forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties”193. 
Dahl‟s understanding of demos is more inclusive than many others, past and 
present. His emphasis on intrinsic equality leads demos to include every person who 
possesses the capacity to practice this equality. The desirability of the Idea of Intrinsic 
Equality is derived from human beings‟ capacity for autonomy, i.e. their ability to 
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govern themselves
194
. Democracy, in this sense, is an instrument for realizing this 
capacity
195
. 
If ordinary members of a political association are equal to each other intrinsically 
regardless of their literacy, education or other qualities as long as they are able to 
possess personal autonomy to “care for themselves” and practice their intrinsic equality, 
democracy cannot exclude them from its demos. The only reasonable exclusion within 
this framework is the exclusion of those, like children, who lack this capacity
196
. This 
situation can be named relative inferiority as opposed to intrinsic equality. This 
inferiority comes from a person‟s inability to decide about what he or she “wants the 
government to do”, rather than his or her servility, wage-earning or any other social or 
economic status
197
. This appears to be different from excluding individuals because of 
their degree of education, gender, or socio-economic status. No adults are “so definitely 
better qualified than others to govern”198. But children are taken to be unqualified to 
govern themselves in Dahl‟s theory. 
 
 
 
3.6.4. Dahl’s Theory and the Four-Step Test 
 
 
On the surface, Robert Dahl‟s theory appears to provide democracy with a 
justification for excluding children while including all mentally healthy adults. 
However, he does not give any reason for age-based exclusion that cannot be found in 
the four-step test which has been utilized to exclude adults in the past.  
His categorical principle, with its emphasis on having one‟s interests influenced 
by the decision-making process, uses the first of the four steps. The contingent 
principle, on the other hand, takes Dahl‟s exclusion one step further. This principle is 
but another way of expressing the third of the four steps: it questions a group‟s, i.e. 
children‟s, competence to understand politics and react accordingly. Dahl‟s basic 
theoretical argument is that demos ought to include all individuals who are qualified to 
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govern themselves. His practical conclusion is that „children‟ are to be excluded from 
demos. The gap between the argument and the conclusion is filled by his contention that 
there is nothing problematical with the supposition that „children‟ are not qualified to 
care for themselves. He makes it clear that he does not need any observation to prove 
this supposition beyond personal experience
199
. Although he criticizes Joseph 
Schumpeter because he states that each demos has the right to draw its own boundaries, 
Dahl seems to be content to follow modern demos‟ self-proclaimed boundaries on age 
dimension.  
Highly contestable terminology of human maturation increases the vulnerability 
of Dahl‟s interpretation of the four-step test. It is never clear what is meant by „children‟ 
and „adults‟. Should the terms are used with reference to one‟s relative situation to the 
supposed age of political maturation; whole argument turns into a vicious circle: it 
would be then argued that being excluded from demos is what makes an individual a 
„child‟. Exclusion would be expected to be the basis for itself.  
If these terms are used in accordance with society‟s point of view, this would be 
too indefinite a basis for an academic theory which excludes large portions of 
population from demos. If Dahl is referring to the legal definition of maturity, his 
generalizations on the characteristics of „children‟ would lead one to rightfully question 
whether an individual starts to have the capacity for moral autonomy overnight when 
the age of maturity is lowered from twenty-one to eighteen via legislation.  
Dahl‟s theory gives the impression that „children‟ and „adults‟ are two well-
defined groups and that the only question is the reason for the former‟s exclusion. A 
look at the history of voting age might show whether this is the case in reality. 
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Figure 1.1. Changes in the voting age in Europe in the first half of the twentieth 
century. 
 
 
Sources: For Turkey, Erol Tuncer, Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Seçimler. 1877-1999, 
(Ankara: TESAV Toplumsal Ekonomik Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı, 2002), 154. For 
other countries, Katz, Democracy and Elections, 218-29. 
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Figure 1.2. Changes in the voting age in Europe in the second half of the twentieth 
century. Scattered line indicates the year when the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child was adopted. 
 
Sources: For Turkey, Tuncer, Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Seçimler, 154. For other 
countries, Katz, Democracy and Elections, 218-29. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
The History of Voting Age 
 
 
 
 
While the franchise was limited on many dimensions under various régimes, the 
issue of age was less controversial. Other requirements such as literacy, property and 
taxpaying were already excluding children. Emphasis on „adulthood‟ was merely one of 
many qualities an individual was expected to possess in order to have the privilege to 
vote. 
The voting age of twenty-one, which can be found in the Leveller documents of 
1640s, has survived for centuries in the United Kingdom until it was lowered to 
eighteen in 1969
200
. English colonies in America, Australia, India and South Africa all 
inherited this traditional age requirement as well as many other electoral practices
201
. 
These former colonies (the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka and India) lowered the voting age to eighteen in the twentieth 
century
202
. 
The age limit for both voting and being elected for the third estate was originally 
twenty-five in the French ancien régime203. There appeared a proposal after the 
Revolution to retain this age limit alongside with a citizenship education that would 
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start at the age of twenty-one
204
. However, “adult” Frenchmen (as long as they were in 
compliance with other criteria –if any) have gained the right to vote under various 
regulations concerning voting requirements
205
. Voting age remained at twenty-one in 
France until 1974. In that year, it was lowered to eighteen. The only exception for this 
has been a short period when voting age was twenty-five from 1870 to 1875
206
. 
In 1848, “a German Union Bundestag adopted suffrage for independent adult 
males”. However, German states under the Union retained their right to define these two 
key terms, „independence‟ and „adulthood‟207. 
In the Figure 2, the year-by-year average of voting age in the world shows an 
almost uninterrupted decrease since the second half of the nineteenth century. In the 
first half of that century, there were two groups of countries: in the first one voting age 
was twenty-one, in the other, it was twenty-five. Voting age was twenty-one in the 
United States
208
, Colombia (for unmarried citizens), and the United Kingdom. It was 
twenty-five in the second group (Belgium, Norway and Portugal). Brazilian and Chilean 
voters were divided between these two groups: voting age was twenty-one for the 
members of holy orders, the married and the commissioned officers in Brazil and 
married voters in Chile, while it was twenty-five for the rest of the Brazilian and 
Chilean voters. The only exception for this period is Uruguay, where the voting age was 
eighteen for the married and twenty for the unmarried. In Colombia, there was no age 
restriction for the married voters until 1843, the year when the right to vote of the 
unmarried voters was equalized to that of the married. The voting age limit for the 
married voters was abolished in 1853 and it stayed so until it has been re-established in 
1886
209
. 
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Figure 2. Changes in the voting age average worldwide (1814-1997). 
 
Source: Katz, Democracy and Elections, 219-228. When the electorate is divided into 
different groups with different voting ages, i.e. conditional groups, these groups are 
taken as different electorates. 
 
 
 
4.1. Conditionality of Voting Age Requirements 
 
 
 
Until 1960s, there appear two important differences between the voting age 
requirements in European and Latin American electoral systems: Latin American 
systems have always had a relatively lower average than their European counterparts 
(Figure 3) and the voting age requirements in Latin America have often been 
conditional, i.e. their electorates have been divided into groups with different voting age 
settings. Except for Argentina and Venezuela, all Latin American countries have set 
different voting age requirements for married and unmarried voters at some stage of 
their histories. In Bolivia, voting age has been eighteen for married voters and twenty-
one for others since 1952. In Brazil, it had been twenty-one for the married and twenty-
five for unmarried until 1889. Chile had had the same voting requirements as Brazil 
until 1877. In Colombia, being married had been a way of being independent of the 
voting age requirement of twenty-one years between the years 1821 and 1843, as well 
18
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as 1853 and 1886. Same had been the situation in Ecuador from 1884 to 1946. In 
Honduras, voting age had been eighteen for the married or the literate and twenty-one 
for others until 1957. Mexico had had the same voting age setting as Honduras from 
1932 to 1969. In Peru the voting age was originally set at twenty-one for the unmarried 
while married people could vote regardless of their age until the year 1933. In Uruguay, 
voting age requirement for the unmarried have been equalized with that for the married 
in 1918. In addition to the conditionality of the voting age, it is also interesting to 
observe how important marital status had been in the past for the voting age in Latin 
American electoral systems
210
. 
 
Figure 3. A comparison between the voting age averages in Europe and Latin America 
(1814-1997). 
 
Source: Katz, Democracy and Elections, 219-28. In conditional cases, conditional 
groups are taken as different electorates. 
 
 
In Europe conditionality appears to be an exception rather than a pattern. Finland 
had had different voting age requirements for townsmen and farmers until 1906: the 
former was twenty-four while the latter was twenty-one. In 1906, it has been equalized 
at the level of twenty-four. In Italy voting age had been increased from twenty-one to 
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thirty between the years 1912 and 1919 for those who could not fulfill certain 
qualifications. Moreover, Italy had abolished a voting age requirement for ex-
servicemen from 1919 to 1975 apart from the de facto age requirement of becoming an 
ex-serviceman. In 1975, the voting age for the others had been lowered from twenty-one 
to eighteen and ex-servicemen ceased to be an exceptional group. Similarly, the voting 
age was nineteen for servicemen and ex-servicemen in the United Kingdom from 1919 
to 1948
211
. The voting age for British women was set with the Representation of the 
People Act of 1918 as thirty while it was twenty-one for men. This inequality has been 
eliminated in 1928
212
. In Portugal, from the year 1879 to 1933, literate voters and the 
heads of the household older than twenty-one could vote in while others had to wait 
until they are twenty-five
213
.  
Apart from the difference in the widespread application of the conditional voting 
ages for different groups, European and Latin American countries also differ to a great 
extent on the conditions. Marital status has almost always been the main criterion for 
different voting age settings in Latin America while European systems had been 
focusing on gender, literacy, dwelling and military service. 
The role of the military service in voting age requirements is not limited to the 
different voting settings for civilians and (ex-) servicemen. Citizen army has been an 
important condition for popular rule since Antiquity
214
. Granting the right to vote to a 
person who has fought for his country is often considered an issue of balance of rights 
and responsibilities
215
. The history of the voting age implies a close parallelism between 
army conscription and the right to vote. Abolishment or lowering of the voting age 
requirement in accordance with military service, as mentioned above, is an obvious 
case. Another one is the long struggle for lowering the voting age from twenty-one to 
eighteen in the United States. Proposals have been appearing “before and after every 
major war, on the grounds that men who were old enough to fight for their country” 
                                                 
211
 Ibid, 221-28. 
212
 Butler, “Electoral Reform”, 738. 
213
 Katz, Democracy and Elections, 226. 
214
 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 245. Hornblower, “Creation and Development of 
Democratic Institutions in Ancient Greece”, 7-8. 
215
 Chan & Clayton, “Should the Voting Age be Lowered to Sixteen? Normative and 
Empirical Considerations”, 541. Schrag, “The Child‟s Status in the Democratic State”, 
455.  
49 
 
deserved the right to vote
216
. This struggle, triggered by the various wars, had served to 
the draft resistance movement during the Vietnam War and has achieved its aim in the 
beginning of 1970s, before the war ended
217
. Wars play a very important role in voting 
age reductions. This role can also be observed in the timing of the first two of the three 
waves of voting age reduction. 
 
 
 
4.2. Three Waves of Voting Age Reduction 
 
 
 
The history of age restrictions on the right to vote reveals three waves of 
widespread reduction (Figures 4.1 and 4.2):  
Between the years 1918 and 1923, eight countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Turkey, Liechtenstein, Norway and Denmark) have lowered the voting 
age for the whole electorate
218
. The first five of them had had an active role in the 
World War I. In addition to these, two other active parties of the war, Italy and the 
United Kingdom had made new arrangements concerning the military servicemen‟s 
right to vote. Italy abolished the education test as well as the age restriction for the ex-
servicemen in 1919
219
. The United Kingdom, on the other hand lowered the age 
restriction for servicemen and ex-servicemen to nineteen in 1918 while maintaining the 
traditional age limit for the rest of the electorate
220. Turkey‟s reducing the voting age 
from twenty-five to eighteen at once is the most striking reduction in this wave.  
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Figure 4.1. Percentage of the number of changes in voting age in the electoral systems 
on a yearly basis (1900-1997) 
 
Source: Katz, Democracy and Elections, 218-29. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Percentage of changes in voting age in European and North American 
electoral systems on a yearly basis. 
 
Source: Katz, Democracy and Elections, 218-29. 
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The second wave has started in 1944. During the second wave, eight countries 
(Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Japan and South Africa as well as Ecuador and 
Venezuela) have lowered the voting age. During the second wave, Germany increased 
the voting age from twenty to twenty-one and the United Kingdom abolished the (ex-) 
servicemen‟s right to vote early221. 
The first two waves reflect a close correlation between voting age reforms and 
global wars whereas the beginning and the spread of the third wave coincides with the 
student movements. Countries such as Austria, Germany, Belgium, which have never 
made any reduction in the voting age for decades, has lowered the voting age shortly 
after the war has ended. That is also the case for Japan in the second wave: the country 
has made the only voting age reduction in its history after the World War II. The United 
Kingdom has lowered it for military servicemen and ex-servicemen in 1918 and Italy 
has abolished the age restriction for ex-servicemen altogether in 1919. The relationship 
between the first wave and the World War I is also supported by the fact that this wave 
is almost completely limited to Europe where the war was generally being fought
222
. 
The relationship between the timing of the third wave and that of the worldwide 
student revolts is striking. From 1958 to 1967, only three countries have lowered voting 
age: Denmark and Turkey to twenty-one and Sri Lanka to eighteen. However, within 
the decade following the year 1968, almost all the European and North American 
countries, as well as Chile and Colombia, have lowered age limits (Table 1). In Mexico, 
where voting age was already eighteen for married voters, voting age for unmarried 
voters was equalized to that for the married. 
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Table 1. First two decades of the third wave of voting age reduction. 
Sources: For Turkey, Tuncer, Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Seçimler, 154. For India, The 
Constitution (Sixty-first Amendment) Act. For the rest, Katz, Democracy and Elections, 
218-29. 
 
It is interesting to observe that the voting age reduction in Greece has followed the 
delayed student activism, which has played an important role in bringing down the 
military régime: 
“In the Western societies, the years 1967-1969 are often taken to be an 
important landmark in the history of student activism. In those same 
years Greece was under the iron grip of a military dictatorship (1967-
1974) … . Yet a few years later, in November 1973, a delayed reaction, 
as it were, struck with bloody vengeance at the regime of the colonels, 
causing a shake-up in its leadership.”223 
In 1974, the dictatorship was overthrown with the university students‟ active 
contribution. In 1977, voting age was lowered from twenty-one to twenty. Four years 
later, it was again lowered to eighteen
224
. 
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224
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Countries that have had set the voting age at eighteen years of age prior to 1968: Argentina, 
Bolivia (for married voters), Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico (married), Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the USSR. 
1968 Austria (19), Iceland (20) 
1969 Finland (20), Norway (20), Mexico (18), New Zealand (20) , the UK (18) 
1970 Germany (18), Sweden (19), Chile (18), Canada (18)  
1971 Denmark (20), Ireland (18), the United States (18) 
1972 Finland (18), Luxembourg (18), Netherlands (18) 
1973 Liechtenstein (20)  
1974 France (18), Portugal (18), New Zealand (18) , Australia (18) 
1975 Italy (18), Sweden (18), Colombia (18) 
1976 Nigeria (18) 
1977 Greece (20), Spain (21) 
1978 Norway (18), Spain (18) 
1980 Denmark (18) 
1981 Belgium (18), Greece (18), Philippines (15) 
1984 Iceland (18) 
1987 Turkey (19) 
1988 Brazil (16), India (18) 
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The degree of student violence in the United States, within which the slogan “no 
conscription without representation” had had an important place, has considerably 
decreased after the voting age reform of 1971. Student demonstrations, strikes and 
building takeovers of the 60s gave way to new political groups such as Public Interest 
Research Groups and student lobbies in the 70s
225
. 
Before the third wave, no European country‟s voting age was eighteen226. The 
third wave has completely transformed the scene. Article 1 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child has institutionalized the transformation by 
defining “child” as “every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under 
the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”. When the UN Convention 
was adopted in 1989, there was a “near consensus” about the voting age of eighteen. It 
was sixteen in Brazil since 1988, and fifteen in Philippines since 1981
227
. This 
consensus is also reflected in the first section of Article 1 of the European Convention 
on the Exercise of Children‟s Rights (1996). “Recommendation 1315 on the minimum 
age of voting” of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly which was adopted by 
the Assembly on 31 January 1997 “calls on the Committee of Ministers to recommend 
that member states ... rapidly harmonise” the voting age at eighteen years “in all 
countries and for all elections”228. In 2001, there were eight out of 76 countries which 
had their voting age above eighteen (Table 2), half of which were rated „free‟ by the 
Freedom House for the period (Table 3) and none of which were in Europe or North 
America. 
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Table 2. Voting age requirements for 76 countries in 2001. 
Argentina
a
 18 Ecuador
a
 18 Malaysia
a
 21 Sao Tome
a
 18 
Australia
a
 18 Estonia
a
 18 Maldives
a
 21 Singapore
a
 21 
Austria
b
 18 Finland
b
 18 Mali
a
 18 Slovakia
a
 18 
Bahamas
a
 18 France
ab
 18 Malta
a
 18 Slovenia
a
 18 
Bangladesh
a
 18 Germany
ab
 18 Micronesia
a
 18 South Africa
a
 18 
Barbados
a
 18 Greece
b
 18 Mongolia
a
 18 South Korea
a
 20 
Belgium
ab
 18 Guyana
a
 18 Namibia
a
 18 Spain
ab
 18 
Belize
a
 18 Hungary
a
 18 Netherlands
ab
 18 St. Lucia
a
 18 
Benin
a
 18 India
a
 18 New Zealand
a
 18 St. Vincent
a
 18 
Bolivia
a
 18 Ireland
ab
 18 Norway
b
 18 Sweden
ab
 18 
Brazil
a
 16 Israel
ab
 18 Pakistan
a
 21 Switzerland
b
 18 
Bulgaria
ab
 18 Italy
ab
 18 Panama
a
 18 Taiwan
a
 20 
Canada
a
 18 Jamaica
a
 18 Papua New G.
a
 18 Turkey
c 
18 
Cape Verde
a
 18 Japan
ab
 20 Philipinnes
a
 18 Trinidad & T.
a
 18 
Chile
a
 18 Latvia
a
 18 Poland
a
 18 U. Kingdom
ab
 18 
Costa Rica
a
 18 Lithuania
a
 18 Portugal
ab
 18 United States
b
 18 
Cyprus
a
 18 Luxembourg
a
 18 Romania
a
 18 Uruguay
a
 18 
Czech Republic
a
 18 Madagascar
a
 18 Russian Fed.
b
 18 Vanuatu
a
 18 
Denmark
ab
 18 Malawi
a
 18 Samoa
a
 21 Venezuela
a
 18 
Sources: 
aBlais et al., “Deciding who has the right to vote: a comparative analysis of 
election laws”, 44-51. bFeride Eroğlu, Çeşitli Ülkelerde Milletvekili Seçme ve Seçilmeye 
İlişkin Düzenlemeler (Bilgi Notu), (Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Kütüphane 
ve Dokümantasyon Müdürlüğü Araştırma Servisi, Nisan 2001). cTürkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Anayasası, Article 67. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Freedom ratings for 8 countries with voting ages above eighteen in 2001. 
Country Voting Age Freedom Rating 
Japan 20 1.5 (Free) 
Malaysia 21 5.0 (Partly Free) 
Maldives 21 5.5 (Not Free) 
Pakistan 21 5.5 (Not Free) 
Samoa 21 2.0 (Free) 
Singapore 21 5.0 (Partly Free) 
South Korea 20 2.0 (Free) 
Taiwan 20 1.5 (Free) 
Source: Freedom House, “Combined Average Ratings: Independent Countries 2001-
2002”, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=220&year=2002, retrieved 
May 18th, 2009. 
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4.3. Lowering the Voting Age to Sixteen: a New Wave? 
 
 
 
The “near consensus” on the voting age of eighteen has begun changing recently 
despite the fact that above-mentioned conventions are still being utilized by scholars 
against the proposals to lower the voting age further from eighteen
229
. In 1994 Nelson 
Mandela has proposed to set the voting age at fourteen in South Africa, but the proposal 
has not become law
230
. Lower Saxony in Germany has lowered voting age in local 
elections to sixteen in 1995. Afterwards, other German Lӓnder (Schleswig-Holstein and 
Saxony-Anhalt in 1997
231
) as well as three Austrian Lӓnder have followed Lower 
Saxony‟s example232. Following the reduction, some German Lӓnder have had a higher 
turnout rate in the 16-17 age group than that of 18-35
233
. In 2006, British Crown 
Dependency Isle of Man has lowered the voting age to sixteen with the Article 4 of the 
Representation of the People (Amendment) Act
234
.  
 
 
 
4.3.1. Austrian Wahlrechtsreform 
 
 
In 2007, Austria has followed Isle of Man “with no objection” in the parliament 
and has become the first member of the European Union to lower the voting age to 
sixteen for national elections
235
. This has resulted in the enfranchisement of 184,000 
Austrians
236
. 
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In the Austrian Bundesrat‟s discussion of the Wahlrechtsreform (Voting Right 
Reform) 2007, several themes concerning the right to vote are repeated by the members 
of the parliament. Since the parliament was positive about the proposed reduction in the 
voting age, the official summary of the debate does not refer to any counter-
arguments
237
. However, it is important to notice what arguments are utilized by the 
parliamentarians to support the proposal. 
The hallmark of the discussion is the idea that the 16-17 age group has proven its 
political ability in the Lӓnder elections and they deserve to have a say on the federal 
degree. Various parliamentarians refer to the necessity to balance the electoral power of 
the elders via voting age reduction and to the youth‟s ability to have a critical approach 
to problems. They also mention the already existing rights and responsibilities of the 
sixteen year olds and provided that they are granted the right to vote, their right to 
abstain from using it.  
The discussion of the Wahlrechtsreform is in complete harmony with the four-
step test for enfranchisement. The Bundesrat, as a whole, accepts that the 16-17 age 
group is a part of Austrian society, that they have interests to be represented by 
themselves via elections, and that they are competent to consider these interests and 
vote accordingly. Moreover, Austrian parliamentarians are content that this will not 
harm the régime stability. On the contrary, they express their will to be the pioneers for 
Europe in reducing the voting age further from eighteen. 
 
 
 
4.3.2. Three Bills in the United Kingdom 
 
 
Although Robert Blackburn has seen “negligible prospect of such a change, and 
little chance either of a parliamentary debate on the issue” in 1993238, bills to lower the 
voting age to sixteen continue to being drafted since the end of 1990s in the United 
Kingdom. None of them has become law, but the proportion of „ayes‟ to „noes‟ shows a 
significant change through time (Figure 5). On 15 December 1999, 69th Amendment of 
the Representation of the People Bill to lower the voting age to sixteen has been put to 
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the vote in the House of Commons and it received 36 „ayes‟ and 434 „noes‟239. Six years 
later, on 25 October 2005, while the Electoral Administration Bill, which includes many 
reforms concerning the British Electoral System, was being discussed, many members 
of the House have proposed voting age reduction
240
. A month after the Electoral 
Administration Bill‟s defeat, the Representation of the People (Reducing the Voting 
Age) Bill, with the sole aim to lower the voting age, has achieved more success: 128 
„ayes‟ and 136 „noes‟241. Labour Party Member for North Cardiff, Julie Morgan have 
had her private member‟s bill, Voting Age (Reduction) Bill, discussed in the House on 
6 Junes 2008, but the bill could not be put to the vote because the permitted time was 
exceeded at its second reading
242
. 
Non-governmental organizations and political parties are cooperating under the 
„Votes at 16 Coalition‟ in the United Kingdom. The coalition, led by the Electoral 
Reform Society, the British Youth Council, the Children‟s Rights Alliance for England, 
the National Union of Students and the National Youth Agency, consists of more than 
30 organizations including the Liberal Party, Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and 
Scottish National Party
243
. The influence of this activism can be observed in the 
increasing support for the bills to lower the voting age to sixteen. 
All three of the parliamentary debates from 1999 to 2008 refer to four central 
considerations: 
i) Whether 16-17 age group is a part of the British society244. 
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Figure 5. A comparison between the votes on two bills to lower the voting age to 
sixteen at the House of Commons of the United Kingdom. 
 
Sources: UK Parliament, House of Commons Hansard Debate, 15 December 1999, 
Column 336. UK Parliament, House of Commons Hansard Debate, 29 November 2005, 
Column 141. 
 
ii) Whether current system is able to represent the interests of the youth245. 
iii) Whether they are competent to participate in elections246. 
iv) What effects the voting age reduction would have on the electoral 
system
247
. 
In addition to these points, which are obviously parallel to the four-step test for 
enfranchisement, the existence of a demand for such change is often questioned by 
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several MPs
248
. In her speech to explain her reasons for her private member‟s bill, Julie 
Morgan (Labour Party) refers to the 16-17 age group‟s organized demand for 
enfranchisement
249
. 
As can be seen from the summary above, the parliamentary discussions 
conducted by the House of Commons in 1999, 2005 and 2008 comply with the four-step 
model for enfranchisement.  
 
 
 
4.3.3. Bill C-261 in Canada 
 
 
Attempts to lower the voting age further from eighteen are not limited to Europe. 
A private member‟s bill (C-261) to “amend the Canada Elections Act (voter and 
candidate age)” has been introduced to the Parliament of Canada by the Liberal MP 
Mark Holland on 4 November 2004. The bill has been discussed by the Parliament on 8 
June 2005. Members of Bloc Québécois, New Democratic Party and Liberal Party have 
spoken in favor of the bill. However, it received cross-party refusal as well as cross-
party support: all CPC members engaged in the parliamentary debate opposed the bill. 
Some members of the Liberal Party have joined them in their criticisms. The bill has 
been defeated on division
250
. 
When the parliamentary debate on the Bill C-261 is analyzed, it can be seen that 
the statements of Canadian MPs comply with the themes of the four-step test: 
community membership (Bergeron, Desjerlais, Poilievre and Bains), representation of 
interests (Bains, Bergeron and Holland), competence (Bains, Poilievre and St. Amand) 
and régime stability (Harrison, St. Amand, Holland, Bains, Poilievre and Desjerlais). 
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4.3.4. Other Recent Developments 
 
 
A similar campaign to that of the Votes at 16 Coalition in the UK is led by the 
National Youth Rights Association in the United States. Although voting age reduction 
is not the sole aim of this latter organization, it supports legislators who “have promoted 
lowering the voting age in their jurisdictions”251. Organized demand in the United States 
results in some local reforms. For instance, the voting age for local elections has been 
reduced to seventeen in Cambridge, Massachusetts a few years ago
252
.  
On 20 August 2004, Victorian Electoral Commission of the Australian State of 
Victoria prepared a report titled “Lowering the Voting Age” in favor of lowering the 
voting age from eighteen to seventeen and keeping seventeen year-olds out of 
compulsory enrollment
253
. JSCEM (Joint Standing Committee On Electoral Matters, 
which “reviews the „matters concerning‟” the conduct of the elections after every 
federal election in Australia
254) considered the issue both at its meeting on “civics and 
electoral education” in 2006255 and after the 2007 Federal Election256. 
On 4 May 2009, a group of 15 parliamentarians in the Council of Europe (one of 
which was AKP member Lokman Ayva) has delivered a motion to the CE requesting 
for an “investigation on the advantages and drawbacks of ... lowering of the voting age 
to 16 in all member countries of the Council of Europe”. The text of the motion can be 
summarized in three points: 
a) The 16-17 age group has shown their competence in the countries where 
they were enfranchised in local or national elections. 
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b) Statistics show that European population is getting older and this increases 
the risk of having the political agenda dominated by the interests of older 
people. 
c) Thus, enfranchising lower age groups might improve European democracy 
“in a time, when societies more than ever will need the commitment and 
work efforts of young people in order to keep economical growth, social 
security systems and social cohesion” 257. 
This motion, clearly, is completely built upon the themes of the four-step test for 
enfranchisement with its emphasis on competence, representation of interests and 
régime stability. 
 
 
 
4.3.5. Some Remarks on the Possibility of a Fourth Wave 
 
 
If all these happenings mark the coming (if not the beginning) of a new wave, 
several remarks deserve to be added here:  
1) All of the above-mentioned three waves happened after a period of 
stability in the worldwide average of the voting ages. This is the case since 
1980s (Figure 2).  
2) All of the three previous waves have influenced many countries in a few 
years. Although some countries lowered the voting age to sixteen in the 
first decade of the twentieth century, the widespread impact, which was 
typical for the previous waves, has not happened yet. 
3) However, this does not necessarily mean that a fourth wave is not coming. 
Recent reductions might indicate a fore-runner wave like the one happened 
before the third: Austria, Netherlands, Denmark, Sri Lanka and Turkey 
were the only five countries lowering the voting age in the whole two 
decades before the third wave has led to voting age reductions in more 
than ten countries from 1968 to 1970 (Table 1). 
4) The slow appearance of the possible fourth wave can also be linked to two 
factors:  
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i. The definition of the „child‟ has never been internationally 
institutionalized the way it has been via the Article 1 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 
and the first section of the Article 1 of the European 
Convention on the Exercise of Children‟s Rights (1996).  
ii. Previous waves have occurred either after global wars (first 
and second waves) or widespread student movements (third 
wave). The fourth wave, so far, has been led by the concern 
with the rightfulness of the current voting age settings. It can 
be claimed that each of the first three waves was marked with 
some kind of violence while the signs of the fourth wave so 
far happened in a peaceful environment of discussion and 
legislation. 
 
 
 
4.4. Mechanics of Voting Age Reductions and the Four-Step Test 
 
 
 
Scholarly analyses often give the impression that „children‟ and „adults‟ are two 
stable groups and the main question is whether the former has to be included in the 
electorate. Reality diverges from this impression to a large extent: the history of voting 
age is a history of change and this change almost always takes place in favor of lower 
age groups. This brings about a question: what makes reductions the dominant pattern 
of the history of voting age given the reluctance „adults‟ have when it comes to granting 
the right to vote to „children‟? 
The history of voting age makes it clear that countries do not reduce the voting 
age randomly. Major waves of voting age reduction follow the youth‟s active 
involvement in political life. In the first two waves, young people have proven their 
being a valuable part of society by taking responsibility and fighting for the future of 
their countries. In the third wave, university students have shown that they are political 
actors and that they are ready to come into action when it comes to their own interests.  
Dahl‟s formulation of demos (as the collectivity of individuals who are qualified 
to govern themselves) is a helpful explanation for the above-mentioned pattern of 
voting age reductions. However, the usefulness of this formulation goes beyond Dahl‟s 
63 
 
conclusions. When an age-group‟s political activism proves its members‟ capacity for 
moral autonomy, the label of „childhood‟ is put aside and that age-group is included in 
the electorate. The history of the voting age and the parliamentary debates on the 
possibility of lowering the voting age further from eighteen proves the validity of the 
four-step test. Those who have not passed the test (yet) continue to be deemed 
„children‟ but the validity of the test proves that the door is never closed in a democratic 
régime.  
However, all these conclusions are built upon the assumption that the „adults‟ (or 
the policymakers among them) will consider the youth‟s political activism as a signal of 
their political awareness and competence. What happens if this is not the case? The 
Turkish case might give an answer to this question. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
The Turkish Case 
 
 
 
 
The history of voting age in Turkey includes many anomalies:  
i) Turkey has been one of the first countries to reduce the voting age to 
eighteen in 1921
258
.  
ii) This reduction also constitutes the most abrupt reduction in the history of 
voting age
259
. It has changed the voting age from twenty-five to eighteen 
at once. 
iii) Turkey is one of the few countries with a voting age increase in history. It 
was increased from eighteen to twenty-two in 1934
260
. 
iv) It is one of the latest participants of the third wave. The voting age was 
lowered from twenty-one to nineteen in 1987. This turns out to be an even 
greater anomaly given the dimensions of the student demonstrations in 
Turkey. 
v) Turkey is one of the latest to lower the voting age to eighteen. It happened 
in 1995 –six years after the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child has 
set the age of adulthood at the age of eighteen. This means, according to 
the UN Convention, a portion of mentally healthy „adults‟ have been 
excluded from Turkish electorate for six years. 
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All these anomalies deserve an analysis in terms of Turkish politics and Turkish 
perception of the youth. 
 
 
 
5.1. Educating the Youth 
 
 
 
The first document to set the voting age in Turkey was the Temporary Law for 
Parliamentary Elections (İntihab-ı Mebusan Kanun-ı Muvakkatı) of 1908. According to 
this law, the voting age was twenty-five both for primary and secondary voters
261
. In 
1921, during the Turkish War of Independence, it was lowered to eighteen by the Grand 
National Assembly. This reduction is in perfect compliance with the war-dominated 
characteristics of the first wave. However, the level of this reduction is beyond all the 
other participants of this wave. All of the European and North American countries have 
lowered the voting age to eighteen decades later (during the third wave, let alone the 
second). 
Turkish youth has been perceived a very important part of the régime in the first 
decades following the formation of Turkish Republic. The young republic was still 
trying to cut “ties with the Ottoman past, the world of the elders”. Atatürk‟s address to 
the youth symbolized the importance given to them and this importance is also verified 
by those who were young in those years. The central authority‟s attempt to organize 
Turkish youth in accordance with the new régime has materialized in the formation of 
the Millî Türk Talebe Birliği (MTTB) in 1924262. 
However, the difference between the urban and rural youths was far from 
satisfactory for the régime. While the new republic was attempting at creating “a new 
type of person with a new mind-set”263, İsmet İnönü has stated that that generation had 
to “commit its whole life to” the task of creating “the organic nation we envision”264. 
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1930s have been the period of turning the central élite‟s authority into an ideology265. 
This ideology had to be taught to the public and various institutions from Türk Ocakları 
to Halk Evleri have been utilized for this purpose
266
. In 1935, in the Fourth General 
Assembly of the Republican People‟s Party (CHP), six principles of Kemalism have 
been adopted and the party organization has been merged with state bureaucracy
267
. 
Increase in the voting age from eighteen to twenty-two (1934) falls into this period of 
single-party régime, ideological development and centralization.  
 
 
 
5.2. A Moderate Reduction 
 
 
 
As the developments were paving way for the 1960 military coup, university 
students were playing an active role against the Democratic Party (DP) government
268
. 
They were organizing “protest rallies, demonstrations, and walkouts”. Major university 
campuses in Istanbul and Ankara were in turmoil
269
. A month before the coup, Prime 
Minister Adnan Menderes has found himself surrounded by young protesters
270
.  
After the military coup of 1960, the Committee of National Unity (CNU) has 
formed a Constituent Assembly in order to form a new constitution. The electoral 
commission of this Assembly has come up with a draft which was proposing to lower 
the voting age from twenty-two to back to eighteen. This proposal has been discussed in 
the Constituent Assembly to a large extent because the members of the Assembly could 
not agree on the issue. After the parliamentary debate, the CNU discussed the issue and 
decided that twenty-one is more preferable than eighteen because of the rural youth‟s 
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dependency on their parents and the necessity to keep politics out of schools
271
. The 
changed version of the proposal has been adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 22 
March 1961 despite some parliamentarians‟ objections272.  
The arguments utilized during all these discussions in favor of the reduction can 
be summarized as follows: 
1) Democracy is based on inclusiveness and the right to vote cannot be 
limited arbitrarily
273
. 
2) The youth has shown its political capacity in the past by voting between 
1923 and 1934 or by participating in the 1960 „Revolution‟274.  
3) Eighteen year olds are already politically active and a higher voting age 
will not prevent this
275
. 
4) Eighteen is already recognized as the age limit for various rights and 
responsibilities
276
. 
5) Participating in the elections will contribute to their education277. 
Counter-arguments can be summarized as follows: 
1) The voting age of eighteen will politicize  
a. schools278  
b. military service279. 
2) Those below twenty-two are not educated enough280. 
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3) The rural population needs to be socialized by military service before they 
have the vote
281
. 
4) It contradicts with the general practice in the world282 (this argument met 
some objections based on the differences between Turkey and other 
countries
283
). 
5) Eighteen year olds are not mature enough  
a. psychologically284,  
b. organically285,  
c. socially286,  
d. politically287. 
6) They are still dependent on  
a. their parents288,  
b. education system289,  
c. state290. 
7) There is no reason to change the previous setting, which must have had 
reasonable grounds
291
. 
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In addition to these, Emin Soysal‟s emphasis on the undesirability of having 
illiterate voters is worth mentioning in terms of competence
292
. 
All these arguments are in compliance with the four-step test. Argument 4 for 
reduction and counter-argument 6 refer to community membership and representation 
of interests. Arguments 2 and 3, as well as counter-arguments 2, 3 and 5 question the 
competence of the age-group. Finally, argument 5 and counter-arguments 1, 4 and 7 
reflect the emphasis on régime stability.  
 
 
 
5.3. Politicized, Organized, Disenfranchised 
 
 
 
The 1961 Constitution was “the most liberal democratic constitution of 
Turkey”293. It has provided the citizens with the rights of association and expression. 
University students, who were already politically active during the 1960 Coup, were 
surrounded with a highly political environment but they were deprived of the right to 
use the basic conventional way of political participation, i.e. the right to vote. Student 
protests in Turkey have begun before the worldwide wave of university demonstrations 
of 1968
294
. Students were highly alienated from the concept of “rule of the people”, i.e. 
demokratia, and they preferred “rule for the people” to it295. After all, they were not 
included in the demos of the existing demokratia. When the influence of the worldwide 
student revolts has been added to this equation the result was “increased violence, 
followed by brutal repression, subsequent to the military coup of 1971”296. 
Student activists were now a threat for the régime. “The media referred to [them] 
as eşkıya, or bandits”297. İsmet İnönü, the leader of the CHP, referred to them as 
“hoodlums”298. In 1972, following the 1971 Coup, several student leaders were hanged 
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by the military tribunal
299
. While almost all of the European and American university 
youth were being welcomed to the electorate and revolts were being transformed into 
organized legal political activities, student demonstrations in Turkey were getting 
outside university campuses
300
. Kalaycıoğlu observes that 
“[f]reedom of association and expression provided by the 1961 
Constitution seemed to have paved the way for a downturn in 
conventional forms of political participation in Turkey. Instead of 
mainly strengthening the legal and conventional channels of political 
participation, the democratic regime had given way to the development 
of a highly fragmented, polarized, and volatile electorate.”301 
However, university students could not use the most “conventional channel of 
political participation” and their clear signal that they constitute an active part of the 
political society was being ignored by the decision-makers. The demand from below 
was being considered a lawless revolt. Politically aware university students could not 
reach the ballot. 
There appears a remarkable difference between the Western democracies‟ 
immediate reaction of enfranchising university students as early as the beginning of 
1970s and Turkish example of leaving them disenfranchised. The reason for this 
difference can be found in Sayarı‟s observation on the difference between Western and 
Turkish politics: 
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“Even a cursory review of the evolution of multiparty politics in 
Turkey shows that the efforts of the military and bureaucratic elites to 
shape the party system from above periodically … have been singularly 
important in the evolution of the country‟s party politics. [In Western 
Europe], societal forces from below rather than the actions of the state 
elites from above have been the principal agents of continuity and 
change in party politics.”302 
This passage explains the difference between Western and Turkish reactions to 
student demonstrations to a large extent. During the third wave of voting age reductions, 
societal forces have led the Western policymakers to reduce the voting age in order to 
comply with a newly emerging political group. This resulted in the transformation of 
student activism. University students have shown via political activism that they pass 
the four-step test and this has resulted in their enfranchisement. In Dahl‟s terms, 
democracy has once again managed to include those who are capable of ruling 
themselves. Turkish system, on the other hand, could not. 
 
 
 
5.4. A Very Late Recognition 
 
 
 
The military junta of 1980, which “set out … to devise a new political regime for 
Turkey that would cure all the socioeconomic and political ills of the country”303 has 
left the voting age at twenty-one. It was obviously not deemed a way to “put an end to 
bloodshed, establish law and order” by the military régime304.  
The constitutional reform package of 1987, which has been drafted by Turgut 
Özal and 199 other MPs, was proposing to reduce the voting age from twenty-one to 
nineteen
305
. Turkish Grand National Assembly discussed the voting age part of the 
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reform package on 13 May 1987 and adopted it on the same day. None of the MPs have 
made any statements against voting age reduction during the parliamentary debate. 
However, Social Democratic People‟s Party (SHP) and Democratic Left Party (DSP) 
have proposed to lower the voting age to eighteen rather than to nineteen. The 
arguments against this idea (expressed by Kamil Coşkunoğlu, Constitutional 
Commission Chair) can be summarized as follows: 
1) Political maturity and civil maturity are separate issues and political 
maturity depends on local conditions concerning literacy and economy
306
.  
2) Proposals to lower it further are actually rooted in some political parties‟ 
(obviously, center-left‟s) willingness to attract young people307. 
The arguments for lowering the voting age further to eighteen were: 
1) It implies trust in the public and the youth308. 
2) It is compatible with human psychology309. 
3) It is compatible with the criminal and fiscal responsibilities of the eighteen 
year olds
310
, as well as with their status according to the civil law
311
. 
4) It is in accordance with the democratic practice in other countries312. 
5) The said age group has enough rate of  
a. literacy313, 
b. knowledge314. 
6) It will improve young women‟s status315. 
7) Atatürk has also lowered the voting age to eighteen316. 
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8) Student revolts in the world were avoided by lowering the voting age to 
eighteen
317
. 
The references to community membership, representation of interests, competence 
and régime stability can be observed in these arguments. However, there are two 
interesting justifications in this list: Coşkunoğlu‟s claim that the proposal to lower the 
voting age to eighteen reflects the center-left parties‟ attempts to attract young voters 
and Paşa Sarıoğlu‟s reference to Atatürk. Both of these arguments are based on the 
assumption that the decision to be made concerning the voting age can be based on the 
perceptions of the adult politicians rather than the demand from the below. Even when 
Sarıoğlu refers to the student revolts, it is not clear whether he considers these revolts a 
political demand: he explains that voting age reduction is a valid method to “solve the 
political depression which was a result of the youth movements”318. This expression is 
more relevant to the issue of régime stability rather than the other three themes of the 
four-step test. 
Two years after the TGNA lowered the voting age to nineteen, the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child defined „child‟ as those below the age of 
eighteen. In 1995, another constitutional reform package has been appeared, which 
included a voting age reduction from nineteen to eighteen. This proposal was tabled by 
301 MPs from the True Path Party (DYP), Motherland Party (ANAP) and Social 
Democratic People‟s Party (SHP)319. The reduction was also supported by the 
Republican People‟s Party (CHP), Democratic Left Party (DSP) and Nationalist Action 
Party (MHP)
320
. Although the Welfare Party accepted the rightfulness of the voting age 
reduction, they did not support the proposal since they did not find the changes in the 
Constitution adequate
321
. The reasons for voting age reduction regarded so obvious that 
neither MPs nor the text of the proposal gives any reason for it
322
. The commission 
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report states that the proposal was adopted because “there is an insignificant difference 
between nineteen and eighteen”323. 
 
 
 
5.5. Ignoring the Demand from Below 
 
 
 
As Sayarı states, Turkish political scene is largely dominated by top-down 
decisions of military and bureaucratic élites. The issue of voting age is no exception to 
this observation. In 1934, the single party régime has disenfranchised a large age cohort 
(those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two) at once. University students‟ 
participation in the 1960 Coup was ignored even by the CNU: their willingness to 
overthrow the incumbent party was not considered a proof of their political competence. 
Student activists of 1960s and 1970s were suppressed by the 1971 and 1980 military 
interventions respectively.  
While voting age reductions were finally being discussed in 1987 and 1995, there 
was almost no reference to the youth‟s demand for political recognition (possibly except 
for the statements of Paşa Sarıoğlu). The common theme of both debates was the 
parliamentarians‟ evaluations of the youth. The main consideration was whether it is 
right to give the right to vote to eighteen or nineteen year olds (as Edip Özgenç from the 
DSP puts it in 1987
324
). This is not surprising given Turkish political régime‟s disregard 
for youth political activism.  
The previous chapter has shown that Western democracies have reacted to youth 
political activism by lowering the voting age to eighteen. Such a reaction presupposes 
policymakers‟ willingness to understand the importance of representation and political 
awareness for democracy and to include morally autonomous individuals in demos (in 
terms of Robert Dahl). In this case, demonstrations can result in the enfranchisement of 
new groups. However, when demands for recognition are considered a threat to régime 
stability, violent measures are taken. A ruling élite that focuses on the régime stability 
part of the equation and ignores the rest of the four-step test does not find it necessary to 
recognize any of the demands of an excluded group. 
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The Turkish case demonstrates that electoral régimes are not uniform in terms of 
their reactions to the demands of those who are deemed politically immature. Western 
democracies‟ compliance with Dahl‟s understanding of demos (except for his reference 
to such terms of „childhood‟ and „adulthood‟) should not lead one to claim that the 
demand from below can shape voting age regulations regardless of the political context. 
Clearly, it has not been the case for Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
Academic debates concerning the issue of voting age are often dominated by the 
terminology of human maturation. When the problem is handled via the limited 
reliability of the terms of „childhood‟ and „adulthood‟, analyses tend to focus on the 
supposed characteristics of „children‟ and „adults‟ as a consequence. These analyses 
lead the scholars to justify or criticize the age-based exclusion in terms of the political 
capacities of „children‟. 
However, history of voting age reveals that the main question is not whether it is 
desirable to enfranchise „children‟ as a whole but whether a certain age group deserves 
to be included in demos. Major changes in voting age do not happen randomly. 
Whenever „children‟ play an active role in politics via wars or student revolts, 
widespread waves of voting age reductions appear. Two world wars have resulted in the 
first and second waves of the voting age reductions. Worldwide student demonstrations 
of late 1960s and early 1970s have triggered the third wave of voting age reductions in 
many countries, especially in Europe and North America. Thus, there has to be a 
relationship between political activism and inclusion. 
The four-step test for enfranchisement is a useful tool to understand this 
relationship. Justifications for excluding certain groups from demos refer to the 
questions of community membership, representation of interests, competence and 
régime stability. As long as a group maintains to be politically passive, decision makers 
find themselves free to utilize one or more parts of the four-step test to justify exclusion. 
They deem such individuals as quasi-members of society, already represented by other 
citizens or unable to understand and pursue their own interests. These policymakers 
might change their conception of an excluded group when the members of that group 
prove their political competence via activism. When an excluded group threatens the 
77 
 
status quo by becoming politically active and showing that they constitute an active part 
of the community with political awareness and capacity to pursue their own interests, 
Western democracies start to discuss political maturity of the members of that group. 
This discussion often results in the further expansion of the electorate. This has been the 
case for lower socio-economic groups, African Americans and women in the past. 
History of voting age is in consistency with this picture. 
Thus, Dahl‟s analysis of democratic exclusion seems to be valid for electoral 
régimes (especially for Western democracies): those who are able to care for themselves 
are included in demos. However, his analysis is clouded with his focus on such terms as 
„childhood‟ and „adulthood‟. It should be asked whether a person shows the signs of the 
capacity for moral autonomy rather than whether that person is an „adult‟. „Childhood‟, 
after all, can be defined in thousands of ways and the more definitions there are, the less 
meaningless the criterion will be.  
However, youth political activism does not always result in enfranchisement. 
Enfranchising a group because of its political activism requires a régime that is open to 
include those who prove their moral autonomy. The Turkish case shows that not all 
electoral régimes give the same value to youth political activism. When the political 
élite focuses on the régime stability part of the picture rather than the importance of 
representation and political awareness for democracy, harsh methods are utilized to 
suppress activists. Political system in Turkey differs from its Western counterparts with 
its relationship with societal changes from below: top-down decisions of military and 
bureaucratic élite can disregard the demands of certain groups for recognition. When it 
comes to the issue of voting age, it is university youth which is disregarded by the élite. 
Political awareness of the university students, who have played an active role in the 
military coup of 1960, was disregarded by the CNU. Third wave of voting age 
reductions has by-passed Turkey in 1960s and 70s while the governments and the 
military interregnum were trying to solve the problem of political fragmentation among 
university students. The issue of voting age has been discussed by civilian 
parliamentarians in 1987 and 1995 with almost no reference to the demands of the age 
group in question.  
In sum, the issue of voting age goes beyond the supposed dichotomy between 
„childhood‟ and „adulthood‟. The problem of the child‟s status in the democratic state 
cannot be solved in isolation from the general mechanics of democratic inclusion. The 
attempts to solve the problem with reference to the characteristics of „children‟ and 
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„adults‟ do not reach a satisfactory conclusion since these terms do not refer to any well-
defined groups with unquestionable traits. To understand how democracy comes to turn 
a part of „children‟ into „adults‟ by enfranchising them, the four-step test for 
enfranchisement appears as a useful tool: policymakers tend to lower the voting age 
when an age group proves its capacity to be politically active. Youth political activism 
contributes to the enlargement of the electorate when the decision makers recognize the 
importance of representation of interests and political awareness for democracy. 
However, when they focus on régime stability and disregard the necessity of including 
all morally autonomous individuals in demos, consequences might contribute to the 
emergence of conditions that will threaten the régime itself. 
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